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Swallows as It Might Have Been: 
Regulations Revising Case Law 
By Steve R. Johnson 
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand Professor at 
the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. The author invites comments 
addressed to steve.johnson@unlv.edu. The author 
thanks Matthew Engle and Annette Mann for their 
assistance. 
In Swallows Holding, the Tax Court invalidated an 
interpretive regulation involving return filing by some 
foreign corporations. In a previous report, Johnson 
maintained that the regulation is consistent with prior 
case law and should be upheld under the National 
Muffler standard of deference. Therefore, Sruallou1s 
should be reversed on appeal. 
In this report, Johnson uses Szuallorvs to explore 
Chevron and Brand X issues as to interpretive tax 
regulations generally. He maintains that ~hePron typi-
cally should apply to challenges to those regulations 
(and specifically should apply to the challenge to the 
Swallows regulation) and Brand X should apply when 
tax regulat~ons revise prior case law rules. 
For the author's first report on Srvallou1s Holding, see 
"SzPallozvs Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National 
Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351. 
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This is the second of two reports on the Swallozvs 
Holding decision. 1 In that case, the Tax Court, over three 
dissenting opinions, invalidated a timing rule contained 
in a Treasury regulation under IRC section 882. That 
timing rule provided that some foreign corporations 
could not claim otherwise available deductions if their 
returns for the tax year were filed outside an 18-month 
grace period. The majority and the dissenters clashed 
over which line of authority - Chevron2 or the pre-
Chevron tax-specific line of decisions typified by National 
Muffier3 - provides the governing standard for evaluat-
ing the validity of general authority tax regulations, and 
what result should be reached in the case under the 
governing standard. 
The majority opinion in Swallows identified the Na-
tional Muffler line of cases as controlling. The majority 
saw the regulation as contrary to prior cases, which the 
majority thought had rejected that the statute authorizes 
a timing limitation.-± Thus, the regulation' did not pass 
muster under National Muffler and also would not have 
passed muster under Chevron had Chevron provided the 
controlling standard. 
I believe that Swallows was wrongly decided and 
should be reversed on appeal. 5 My first report6 advanced 
the more modest case for reversal. The Szvallozus majority 
opinion misread the cases on which it relied. Properly 
analyzed, those cases establish, rather than reject the 
proposition, that a timing limitation is contemplated by 
the statute,' and they do not fix the point at which the 
limitation is triggered.8 That being so, the only question 
is line-drawing. Treasury, not the courts, is the body 
1 Swallozus Holding, Ltd. v. Co1nn11'ssioner, 126 T.C. 96, Doc 
2006-1541, 2006 TNT 18-10 (2006). 
2C!1evron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
3National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 
(1979). 
'See 126 T.C. at 137 and 148. 
5The IRS filed its notice of appeal to the Third Circuit on July 
5, 2006. 
11Steve R. Johnson, "SzualloH1s Holding as It Ts: The Distortion 
of "tjational Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351. 
'See id. Part II. 
'Id. Part III.A. 
773 
    
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
authorized to fill in statutory gaps,9 and the line drawn 
by the regulation is reasonable.HJ The lesson suggested in 
the first report is that the Swallows majority distorted the 
standard it purported to apply. National Muffler and the 
line of cases of which it is a part are deferential. In the 
hands of the Swallows majority, deference was improperly 
converted into strict scrutiny. 11 
If I am right in the above conclusions, Swallows could 
be reversed on fairly straightforward grounds without 
having to grapple with larger issues arising from Chevron 
and from the Supreme Court's Brand X decision last 
year.12 In Brand X, the Supreme Court held: "A court's 
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only 
if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and 
thus leaves no room for agency discretion."13 
In light of those cases, there are tvvo larger issues. First, 
should Chevron, not National Muffler, provide the control-
ling standard in Swallows? Second, does Brand X autho-
rize the Treasury to, in effect, overrule prior case law via 
a general authority regulation? Those issues deserve 
examination, and if there had been a conflict in Suiallows 
between the regulation and the earlier cases, .Swallows 
would have been a good vehicle for that examination. 
Accordingly, in this report I assume a condition contrary 
to fact: that there is a genuine conflict between the 
regulation and the previous cases. I will sometimes refer 
to "mutated ,Swallouis," to make clear that I am talking 
about the case as it might have been, not as it was. 
I believe that, on Chevron and Brand X grounds, the 
regulation at issue in Swallows is valid, even in the 
mutated scenario. Parts I and II of this article provide the 
foundation. Part I sketches Swallozos, emphasizing as-
pects relevant to the second report. Part II analyzes the 
prior cases on which the Swallows majority relied. It 
shows why those cases endorsed some timing limitation, 
and it assumes arguendo that they established a rule that 
the terminal date (the date after which the foreign 
corporation is barred from filing a return claiming other-
wise allowable deductions) is the date on which the IRS 
prepares a substitute for return (SFR) for the year. That 
assumption would put the 18-month timing rule in the 
regulation in conflict with the timing rule emanating 
from the prior cases. 
Part III considers the practical question: Does the 
choice of governing standard - Chevron or National 
Muffler - really matter? Will that choice change the 
outcome in an appreciable number of actual cases? My 
answer is that although the choice often will not matter, 
it can matter in situations like mutated Swallows in which 
a regulation contradicts prior case law. 
Parts IV and V address whether Chevron should apply 
to Swallows. I conclude that it should. First, as argued in 
9Id. Part IIl.B. 
10Jd. Part IV 
11 Id. Part V. 
i 2National Cable & Teleco1111n. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serus., 
125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). 
13125 S. Ct. at 2700. 
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Part IV,. general authority regulations - at least ones like 
the regulation at issue in Swallou1s - should be eligible 
for Chevron treatment. Second, as argued in Part V, the 
Swallows regulation should receive deference since that 
regulation passes scrutiny under both steps of Chevron's 
two-step analysis. The regulation passes step one of 
Chevron because section 882(c)(2) does not unambigu-
ously preclude the 18-month timing rule. The purpose of 
the statute - to encourage the filing of returns - is 
furthered by a timing limitation. Indeed, the absence of a 
timing rule would lead to absurd results. The regulation 
passes step tvvo of Chevron because fixing the cutoff date 
at 18 months is within the range of reason. 
Part VI makes the case that, under Brand X, any 
conflict between the regulation and the supposed prior 
judicial rule should be resolved in favor of the regulation. 
The precondition of Brand X - that the administrative 
construction is Otherwise entitled to Chevron deference -
is satisfied for the reasons set out in Parts IV and V. Also, 
the prior cases did not say - and could not have said -
that their supposed "time of SFR" construction "follows 
from the unambiguous terms of [section 882(c)(2)] and 
thus leaves no room for agency discretion." The grounds 
on which the Swallows majority sought to distinguish 
Brand X are misplaced. Indeed, the purported distinc-
tions contort Chevron and Brand X into other, lesser 
approaches to deference. 
I. Swallows 
A. Facts 
The taxpayer was a foreign corporation that owned 
real property in the United States. The corporation was 
on a fiscal year ending on May 31. The tax years at issue 
were 1994 to 1996. The due dates for those returns were 
November 15 of 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively.14 The 
corporation did not file those returns until July 23, 1999. 
The corporation was treated as having elected to treat its 
U.S.-source income as effectively connected with a U.S. 
trade or business. 15 The corporation's deductions for tr,e 
years at issue substantially exceeded its income. The IRS 
disallowed the claimed deductions and asserted deficien-
cies. 
Section 882(c)(2) provides that a foreign corporation 
with effectively connected income can claim deductions 
"only by filing ... a true and accurate return, in the 
manner prescribed in subtitle F, including therein all the 
information which the [IRS] may deem necessary for the 
calculation of such deductions." That requirement en-
tered the law in 1928 and has been reenacted many times 
14Usually, a corporation must file its income tax return by the 
15th day of the third month after the close of its tax year. Section 
6072(b ); reg. section 1.6072-(a). However, foreign corporations 
without an office or place of business in the United States (such 
as the Szvallows taxpayer) may file up to the 15th day of the sixth 
month after the close of the year. Section 6072(c); reg. section 
1.6072-2(b ). 
15126 TC. at 97; see section 882(d)(l). 
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without essential change.16 Subtitle F contains the proce-
dural sections of the code, including section 6072, that 
prescribe when income tax returns are to be filed. 
Nearly 30 years after enactment of the original prede-
cessor of section 882, regulations were promulgated in 
1957. The regulations were amended in 1990 and again in 
2002 and 2003.17 The timing rule at issue in Swallows 
emanated from the 1990 amendments. Those amend-
ments were first proposed in July 19S918 and were 
finalized in December 1990, effective for tax years ending 
after July 31, 1990.19 Before being finalized, the amend-
ments went through the familiar notice-and-comment 
process. 20 Treasury stated, "These regulations are neces-
sary so that the income tax returns I of foreign corpora-
tions and nonresident alien individuals J will be filed in a 
timely manner."21 
The 1990 amendments set out timing rules for foreign 
corporations in reg. section l.SS2-4 and broadly similar 
timing rules for nonresident alien individuals in reg. 
section 1.874-1. Under the amended regulation, a foreign 
corporation may avail itself of otherwise allowable de-
ductions and credits for the year only if it files its federal 
income tax return by a specified time.22 
The rules defining the terminal date include complexi-
ties and special rules unnecessary to explore for mutated 
Swallows purposes. 23 In general, and as applicable to the 
Swallows taxpayer, for the corporation to be allowed 
deductions, "the required return for the current taxable 
year must be filed within IS months of the due date as set 
forth in section 6072 and the regulations, under that 
section, for filing the return for the current taxable 
year. "2-1 For simplicity, I use the 18-month terminal date 
throughout this report. It was the failure of the Swallows 
taxpayer to file its 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns within the 
IS-month period that prompted the IRS to disallow the 
deductions claimed for those years. 
The taxpayer challenged the validity of the regulation. 
The majority opinion, invalidating the IS-month time 
limit in the regulation, was authored by judge Laro, with 
12 judges joining in the opinion and two judges concur-
ring in the result only. judges Swift, Halpern, and 
Holmes wrote dissenting opinions. 
16The statutory history is recounted at 126 T.C. at 107-111. 
17Id. at 125-129. 
1854 Fed. Reg. 31545 (July 31, 1989). 
"T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 55 Fed. Reg. 50827-01 (Dec. 11, 
1990), corrected at 56 Fed. Reg. 1361-01 (Jan. 14, 1991) and 56 Fed. 
Reg. 5455-07 (Feb. 11, 1991). 
20See proc. reg. section 601.601; IRM 30(15) and 32.1.5. 
21T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172. 
"Reg. section l.882-4(a)(2). 
23For full statement of the rules, see reg. section l.882-4(a)(3); 
, see also 126 T.C. at 135 n.17 (majority opinion) and 151-53 (Swift, 
)., dissenting). 
2
-1Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(i). The 1990 regulation allows the 
IRS to waive the 18-month requirement for good cause, based 
on the facts and circumstances, if shown by the foreign corpo-
ration. Reg. section 1.882-4(a)(3)(ii). It does not appear that the· 
Szvallozus taxpayer sought that waiver. 
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B. Majority Opinion 
Since the regulation in question was promulgated 
under the general authority of section 7S05(a), not under 
specific authority within section SS2 itself, the regulation 
is an interpretive regulation. The Swallows majority iden-
tified National Muffler as the standard by which to assess 
the validity of interpretive tax regulations. 25 In general, a 
regulation is valid under that standard if it implements 
Congress's intention in a reasonable manner - that is, if 
it "harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its 
origin, and its purpose."26 The majority concluded that 
the regulation failed under that standard. The majority 
suggested that it would have reached the same result 
under Chevron: 
We have previously stated ... "we are inclined to 
the view that the traditional, i.e., National Muffler 
standard, has not been changed by Chevron, but has 
merely been restated in a practical two-part test 
with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of 
legislative history and the degree of deference to be 
accorded to a regulation." ... Here, we conclude 
likewise that we need not parse the semantics of the 
two tests to discern any substantive difference 
between them. While we apply a Natl. Muffler 
analysis, our result under a Chevron analysis would 
be the same. 27 
The majority did not explain that "same result" con-
clusion. Presumably, it rests on the majority's "plain 
meaning" argument. The majority stated: "A plain read-
ing of the relevant text [of section S82(c)(2)] in the context 
of the ... Code shows that the text includes no timely 
filing requirement. "28 The statute makes filing a return 
"in the manner prescribed by Subtitle F" a condition for 
allowance of deductions. However, the majo:l:-ity held that 
the "plain meaning of the word 'manner,' as used in the 
relevant text, does not include an element of time. " 29 
Thus, when the regulation added a timing rule for 
returns, it impermissibly went beyond the statute. 
The majority noted many code and precode sections 
using both "manner" and "time."30 It concluded that 
"Congress acted intentionally and purposefully when it 
included both 'time' and 'manner' in single sections of 
the referenced statutes but omitted the word 'time' in 
favor of only the word 'manner' in other single sections 
of those statutes."31 Section S82(c)(2) uses the word 
"manner" but omits the word "time." Thus, the majority 
concluded, Congress intended that availability of deduc-
tions depends on the foreign corporation's filing a return 
25126 T.C. at 129-131. The majority added, however, that the 
result it reached would have been the same had it applied 
Chevron instead of National Muffler. Id. at 131. 
26440 U.S. at 476-477. 
27126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Connnis-
sioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392, Doc 95~3474. 95 TNT 63-11 (1995)). 
28ld. at 132. 
29Id. 
30See id. at 132-135. 
31 Id. at 134. 
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in the manner prescribed under subtitle F but does not 
depend on its filing a return when prescribed under 
subtitle F. 
Central to the majority's plain meaning argument 
were the prior cases involving section 882(c)(2), substan-
tially similar section 874(a),32 and their predecessors. The 
line included nine cases from 1939 to 1996 decided by the 
Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), the Tax Court, and the 
Fourth Circuit The Swallows majority believed the regu-
lation to be inconsistent with those cases. According to 
the majority, those cases "repeatedly and consistently 
held that the relevant text did not include a timely filing 
requirement. "33 As a result, the regulation "merely re-
adopted [the IRS's] unsuccessful litigating position."34 As 
described in Part II below, I believe that the majority 
misread those cases. 
Finally, the majority attempted to defuse Brand X. 
Initially, the majority observed: "Given that the Supreme 
Court has historically reviewed Federal tax regulations 
primarily under the reasonableness test of Natl. Muf-
fler . .. , the question arises whether [Brand X], which 
neither cited Natl. Muffler nor involved a Federal tax 
regulation, applies to Federal tax regulations."35 In light 
of its other points, the majority deemed it unnecessary to 
decide that question.36 
The majority's principal point was identifying "sig-
nificant contrasts" between the two cases, which made 
Brand X distinguishable from Swallows "for numerous 
reasons."37 1 First, in Brand X, the agency (the Federal 
Communications Commission) "had carefully consid-
ered technological developments and its own related 
interpretations." The majority could find "no corre-
sponding record of the [Treasury's] consideration of 
whether the relevant text in 1990 included a timely filing 
requirement; the Secretary's rationale for adopting the 
disputed regulations is at best perfunctory."38 
Second, in Brand X, the FCC had not previously ruled 
on the relevant question, but its ruling "was consistent 
with prior FCC rulings." In contrast, the 1990 regulation 
adopted a rule not present in the 1957 regulation and 
"reverse[d] long-settled law."''' 
Third, the FCC had not been a party in the prior case'° 
whose holding the later FCC interpretation contravened. 
"Here, the Commissioner was the unsuccessful party in 
32In relevant respects, the section 874 rules as to nonresident 
alien individuals parallel the section 884 rules as to foreign 
corporations, including conditioning deductions on properly 
filed returns. Accordingly, the tvvo sections are viewed as in pari 
materia. E.g., id. at 112; Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, 153, 
Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT 188-4 (1996). 
33126 T.C. at 137. 
34Id. The Srvallows majority stated that the IRS 
"acknowledge{d] that [its position in Szvallows] is the same as 
that rejected in [the earlier cases]." Id. at 99. The details of the 
pui:gorted concession and the necessity of it are not apparent. 
Id. at 143-144. 
36Id. at 144. 
37Jd. 
3sld. 
39Id. 
'°AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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all of the [prior] cases. In addition, unlike the FCC, 
the Secretary, through the disputed regulations, is at-
tempting to overturn the outco1ne of those cases through 
his general regulatory authority."41 
Fourth, in Brand X, the contrary judicial interpretation 
had preceded the FCC's determination by only five years. 
In contrast, the first of the cases relied on by the Su1alloivs. 
majority preceded the 1990 regulation by over 50 years 
during which time, the majority thought, its holding had 
been sanctified by repeated congressional reenactment of 
the statute without essential change.42 
Finally, the Swallows majority suggested that the 1990 
regulation would be invalid even if Brand X could not be 
distinguished. As quoted above, under Brand X, the 
regulatory interpretation yields to a judicial interpreta-
tion when the court says the statute is unambiguous. The 
Swallozvs majority acknovvledged that the prior cases "did 
not state explicitly that they were applying the un-
ambiguous meaning of the word 'manner.'" Nonetheless, 
the majority said, "we believe that they did so."·B 
C. Dissenting Opinions , 
Five points offered in the dissents are relevant to this 
report. First, Judges Halpern and Holmes concluded that 
Chevron, not National Muffler, should provide the control-
ling standard and that the 1990 regulation is valid under 
Chevron.44 
Second, the same judges agreed that Congress has not 
spoken directly to the question at hand - that the statute 
does not unambiguously preclude the timing rule set out 
in the regulation.'-° Judge Holmes responded to the 
majority's "manner" versus "time" analysis. He offered 
two examples in the tax law in which the statutory term 
"manner" has been interpreted to include a time aspect . .J.6 
Moreover, arguing that we should "recognize that even 
tax statutes are written against a background of common 
law legal usage," Judge Holmes stated, "It is generally 
the case that when a legal instrument omits explicit time 
limits to do something permitted or required, it does not 
ordinarily mean that there are no time limits at all."47 
Third, the dissenters thought that the timing limitation 
in the regulation is reasonable. Judge Swift opined: 
It would seem obvious that the increased number 
of foreign corporation Federal income tax returns 
filed with [the IRS] in today's world (as distin-
guished from the 1930s when the cases relied on by 
the majority were decided) and the increasingly 
41 126 T.C. at 144-145. 
42Id. at 145. The "legislative reenactment" argument is rebut-
ted by Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.A. 
43126 T.C. at 145. 
"Id. at 157-162 (Judge Halpern) and 172-182 (judge Holmes). 
"Id. at 158-160 (judge Halpern) and 164-168 (Judge Holmes). 
46Id. at 165-166 (citing reg. section 1.179-5(a) implementing 
section 179(c) and reg. section 1.826-l(c) implementing section 
835(c)(2)). 
47126 T.C. at 165-166 (citing contract law cases and commen-
tary). But see Estate of Camara v. Comn1issioner, 91 T.C. 957, 
960-963 (1986) (holding that a Form 872-A unlimited consent to 
extend the assessment statute of limitations does not expire after 
the passage of a "reasonable" period of time). 
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complex tax laws and tax administration applicable 
thereto would support, per se, [the IRS's] effort, by 
properly promulgated regulation, to modify and 
clarify, in the above modest manner, the return 
filing deadline that has been applicable to foreign 
corporations.48 
Judge Holmes agreed that the 1990 regulation is 
reasonable. He reasoned thusly: 
The Secretary faced an ambiguous phrase in a Code 
section unambiguously aimed at giving foreign 
corporations a major incentive to file their returns. 
He also learned by experience that some taxpayers 
would wait to file until a notice of deficiency was 
issued ... or would file only after starting a case in 
this Court ... or would refuse to file even after a 
revenue agent came calling. . . . To issue a regula-
tion with a fixed grace period and provision for 
exceptions reflected experience, failed to consider 
no aspect of the problem, and ran counter to no 
reasonable evidence before hirn.49 
Fourth, all three dissenting judges agreed that the 
majority gave too little shrift to Brand X. The grounds 
offered by the majority for distinguishing the cases 
"should not make a difference - [in Brand X] the 
Supreme Court did not balance carefulness of consider-
ation, prior litigation history, or the amount of time that 
had passed between the case law and the new regulation. 
It simply looked to see if the agency had been delegated 
broad regulatory authority and whether its construction 
of an ambiguous statutory phrase was reasonable."50 
Fifth, all three dissenters thought that the•majority had 
misread the earlier cases. They concluded that the later 
cases of the line modified the earliest cases and permitted 
a timing limitation. 51 
II. The Prior Cases 
Covering too many bases, the Swallows majority, in 
various places in its opinion, seemed to read the prior 
cases as standing for all of three different propositions: as 
rejecting that the foreign corporation's return must be 
filed by its due date in order for deductions to be 
available;·as rejecting that the statute permits any timing 
limitation at all; or as establishing a timing rule that is 
different from the timing rule in the regulation. 52 That 
fluidity led judge Halpern to describe (rather charitably) 
the majority's characterization as "confusing."53 
48126 T.C. at 153-154. The IRS had argued essentially to the 
same effect on brief. See id. at 126-127. 
49ld. at 182. 
50/d. at 171-172 (Judge Holmes); see also id. at 149 (Judge 
Swift) and 162 (Judge Halpern). 
51 Id. at 150-151 (judge Swift), 158-160 (Judge Halpern), and 
167-168 (Judge Holmes). 
52See, e.g., id. at 137 (first proposition: "the relevant text 
[does] not include a timely filing requirement"), 140 (second 
proposition: "the relevant text contained no reference to a time 
element"), and 137 n.22 (third proposition: the preparation of an 
SFR by the IRS "divests the taxpayer of its entitlement to file a 
return for itself"). 
53Id. at 158. 
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The first proposition has a "straw man" quality. The 
1990 regulation does not set the terminal date at the due 
date of the foreign corporation's return. Instead, the 
regulation allows an 18-month grace period. Reading the 
prior cases as rejecting a terminal date identical to the 
return due date would say nothing about the validity of 
the regulation. None of the prior cases tested whether an 
18-month grace period would be valid. 
As will be seen below, the second proposition - that 
the prior cases reject any timing element whatsoever - is 
impossible to sustain upon reading the cases. Indeed, all 
of the courts - the BTA, the Tax Court, and the Fourth 
Circuit - that decided the cases clearly held that some 
timing element is contemplated by the statute. 
That leaves only the third proposition: that the cases 
establish a different timing rule from that in the regula-
tion. As will be seen below, that proposition is not well 
founded. However, since that proposition is less wrong 
than the hopeless second proposition, I will assume the 
third proposition to be a valid reading of the prior cases 
to pursue the mutated Swallows analysis in Parts III 
through VI of this report. Specifically, I will assume that 
the prior cases established a rule that the terminal date 
for section 882(c)(2) purposes is the date the IRS prepares 
an SFR for the tax year. 
A. The 'No Timing Rule' View 
We will now review the prior cases to the degree 
necessary to show that they cannot stand for the propo-
sition that the statute does not permit any timing limita-
tion.54 The Swallows majority's best support is the BTA's 
1938 Anglo-A1nerican decision55 although even that case 
has some ambiguity. The IRS' s position appears to have 
been that returns filed even one day after their prescribed 
due dates preclude claiming deductions.s6 1The BTA re-
jected that position in a reviewed decision without dis-
sent. The board acknowledged that the word "manner" 
is linguistically ambiguous. 
It is true, as [the IRS] points out, that "manner" is a 
comprehensive term, and includes, but is more 
comprehensive than, "method, mode, or way." But 
whether it is broad enough to include the element 
of time is a more difficult question. In some in-
stances it has been construed by courts as including 
time; while in others it has been construed as not 
including it.57 
Nonetheless, the BTA thought that the term was clear 
(and did not include a time element) as it is used in the 
tax statutes.58 However, the BTA did not frame its hold-
ing in absolute terms. "We hold ... that the mere fact that 
the return was not filed within the time prescribed by 
54For a more detailed discussion of the cases, see Johnson, 
supra note 6, Part II. , 
55 Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 
38 BTA 711 (1938). The IRS issued a nonacquiescence to Anglo-
American. 1939-1 CB. (pt. 1) 39 . 
56See 38 BTA at 713-714. 
57Id. at 714 (numerous cited cases omitted). 
58Id. at 715 . 
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[what is now section 6072] does not, under the circum-
stances of this case, preclude the allowance of the deduc-
tions claimed."59 Thus, the BTA did not necessarily reject 
all possible terminal dates, just a terminal date identical 
to the return due date, and even that only under the 
circumstances of the particular Case, which may not be 
the circumstances of other cases. Anglo-American was 
quickly followed by two BIA memorandum decisions 
that adhered to Angla-American without additional analy-
sis.60 
However, the line of cases was soon to take a different 
direction. Slightly over a year after Angla-American, the 
BTA decided Taylor Secu11'ties. 61 In a reviewed decision 
over three dissents, the BIA distinguished Angla-
American62 and held for the IRS. The Taylar Securities BIA 
held that the statute contemplates some time cutoff after 
which deductions may not be claimed. Under the statute: 
the allowance to foreign corporations of the credits 
and deductions ordinarily allowable is specifically 
predicated upon such corporations filing returns. In 
view of such a specific prerequisite it is inconceiv-
able that Congress contemplated by that section 
that taxpayers could wait indefinitely to file returns 
and eventually when the [IRS] determined deficien-
cies against them that they could then by filing 
returns obtain all the benefits to which they would 
have been entitled if their returns had been timely 
filed. Such a construction would put a premium on 
evasion,+ since a taxpayer would have nothing to 
lose by not filing a return as required by the 
statute.63 
All of the subsequent cases confirmed Taylor Securities 
in that respect: The statute contemplates a timing require-
ment. Both the BIA and the Fourth Circuit accepted that 
principle in Ardbern.64 
In Blenheim, the BIA held for the IRS, stating that a 
taxpayer cannot "take advantage from an alleged return 
submitted not only after the [IRS prepared an SFR] but 
also after the issuance of a notice of deficiency. "65 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that a timing rule is 
essential to sound tax administration. 
39/d. 
60Mills, Spence & Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1938 WL 8403 (BTA 
memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust Co., Ltd. v. Con11nissioner, 
1939 WL 12044 (BTA memo. 1939). 
61 Taylor Sec. Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 BTA 696 (1939). 
62Unlike the situation in Taylor Securities, the returns in 
Anglo-American had been filed before the IRS issued a notice of 
deficiency, the IRS audited the Anglo-American returns, and the 
SFRs prepared in Anglo-American had not been accepted by the 
commissioner. Id. at 702-703. 
63 /d. at 703-704. 
6
..1Ardbern Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 41 BTA 910, 920 (1940), 
1nodified and remanded on other grounds, 120 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 
1941). The circuit court's modification was based on an equi-
table consideration (the taxpayer had tried to file the returns 
earlier with the \.Vrong IRS office, and the IRS failed to tell the 
taxpayer where it should have filed) that is not present in 
Szuallozvs. 
65Blenheint Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 BTA 1248, 1251 (1940), 
alfd, 125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942). 
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The many administrative problems inherent in the 
application of the federal income tax to foreign 
corporations ... prompted Congress to impose spe- • 
cial conditions on such corporations. In express 
recognition of this fertile danger to the orderly 
. administration of the income tax as applied to 
foreign corporations, Congress conditioned its 
grant of deductions upon the timely filing of true, 
proper and complete returns.66 
Gearday was a companion case to Blenheim. The BIA 
and the Fourth Circuit hewed to the same approach as 
they had in Blenheim, and both held for the IRS. 67 
Espinosa68 arose under section 874(a). Again invoking the 
administrative imperative, the Tax Court held for the IRS, 
stating that a timing limitation is implicit in the statute.69 
The final case, InverWarld, was a section 882(c)(2) deci-
sion. The Tax Court held for the IRS on the strength of 
Georday and Blenhei1n.7o 
That the IRS prevailed on the essential point in six of 
the nine prior cases makes the Swallows majority's re-
peated reference to a "failed" or "unsuccessful" IRS 
litigating position seem strange. More fundamentally, the 
foregoing demonstrates that the prior cases cannot rea-
sonably be read to stand for the proposition that section 
882(c)(2) permits no timing limitation whatsoever. Even 
Anglo-A1nerican did not unambiguously assert that 
proposition, and the subsequent cases plainly rejected it. 
B. The 'Different Timing Rule' View · 
The only remaining possibility for a conflict between 
the 1990 regulation and the prior cases is the proposition • 
that the cases established a timing rule, one different 
from the 18-month period under the regulation. In actu-
ality, that proposition is wrong. The prior decisions did 
not "provide guidance of general applicability concern-
ing timeliness: [they] merely resolve[d] issues created by 
unique fact patterns on a case-by-case basis. . . Timeli-
ness is required, but timeliness is not defined. "71 The 
Blenhei1n circuit court said that it was not "prescribing an 
absolute and rigid rule" regarding the terminal date or 
event,72 and that is true of the other cases as well. 
Possible terminal dates arguably suggested in the 
cases include a reasonable time after the date on which 
the IRS contacted the taxpayer about the missing re-
turn(s),73 the date an IRS agent prepared an SFR,74 the 
66125 F.2d at 909 (emphasis added). 
67 Georday Enter., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1940 WL 10265 (BTA 
memo. 1940), affd, 126 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1942). 
68Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT 
188-4 (1996). 
69107 T.C. at 156-157. 
70InverWorld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-301, Doc 96-
18802, 96 TNT 127-14, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, 3237-3256. 
'.
1126 T.C. at 160 (Halpern,)., dissenting). 
'
2125 F.2d at 910. 
73Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157. 
74E.g., Blenheim, 42 BTA at 1251and125 F.2d at 910. The SFRs • 
that occur in that context are those described in section 6020(b ). 
They are prepared by the IRS from available information, but 
unlike section 6020(a) SFRs, are not signed by the taxpayer. 
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date the SFR was formally accepted or acted upon/5 the 
date the IRS sent the taxpayer a "doomsday letter,"76 the 
date the IRS issued the notice of deficiency,77 the dates 
pleadings were filed in court,78 the date the case was 
tried,79 and the date the IRS made the assessment.so In 
short, the prior cases did not establish a rule. 
Nonetheless, the Swallows majority, in one part of its 
opinion, read the prior cases as standing for a "prepara-
tion of an SFR" terminal date.81 Accordingly, to explore 
Chevron and Brand X issues via mutated Swallows, I will 
assume throughout the rest of this report that the prior 
cases stand for that rule. 
III. Significance of Choice of Standard 
I believe National Muffler and Chevron should be seen 
as cases of the same line, not as two separate and 
competing standards of deference. I will develop this 
thought in a future article. The current report, however, 
accepts arguendo the usual view that the cases represent 
two separate standards. On that premise, this section 
describes Chevron and the tax-specific line of cases of 
which National Muffler is a part. It then evaluates the 
potential effect on the outcomes of actual cases of the 
choice of governing standard, particularly in situations of 
conflict between regulations and prior case law. 
A. Chevron 
This ground is well trodden, so it can be covered 
quickly. In Chevron, the Supreme Court reversed a circuit 
court decision invalidating a regulation promulgated by 
the Environmental Protection Agency. The Court framed 
the proper role of a reviewing court in the now famous 
two-step analysis: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of 
the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
deter!1lines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an adminis-
trative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.82 
75Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 702. 
76Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 151. Such a letter informs the taxpayer 
that, because of the delinquency of the return, the taxpayer may 
not claim otherwise available deductions for the year. 
77E.g., Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703. . 
78Georday, 126 F.2d at 388; Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 702. 
"InverWorld, 71 T.C.M. at 3237-3256 . 
so Ardbern, 120 F.2d at 426. 
81126 T.C. at 137 n.22. 
82/d. at 842-843. 
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At step one in the analysis, the court exercises its 
independent judgment and employs "traditional tools of 
statutory construction. "83 If step two is reached, however, 
the analysis becomes more deferential. 
The court need not conclude that the agency con-
struction was the only one it permissibly could 
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even 
the reading the court would have reached if the 
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceed-
ing. . . . The power of an administrative agency to 
administer a congressionally created program nec-
essarily requires the formulation of policy and the 
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.84 
The two-step analysis provides the framework for 
cases to which Chevron applies. Chevron, however, did not 
tell us to what types of agency interpretations it applies. 
When that question is taken into account, the two-step 
analysis becomes a three-step analysis. Since determining 
whether Chevron applies at all is logically anterior to the 
other steps, the additional inquiry has been called step 
zero.85 
The vacuum that Chevron left with respect to step zero 
was filled, although less than satisfactorily, by the subse-
quent Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart, and Brand X 
cases.86 Those cases are discussed in detail in Part IV.B 
below. For now, it suffices to note that those cases 
revivified the pre-Chevron Skidmore standard by instruct-
ing that Skidmore can apply when Chevron does not. 87 
Skidmore stated: 
The rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under the Act, while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do 
constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.88 
B. Tax-Specific Line of Cases 
Notions of deference have been in the tax jurispru-
dence for generations.89 A recognizably modern form of 
tl3Id. at 843. 
84Id. (citations and punctuation marks omitted). 
83Cass R. Sunstein, "Chevron Step Zero," 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 
191 (2006). 
86United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999); 
Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); 
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. 
Ct. 2688 (2005). 
87E.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 221; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
88Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994). 
89E.g., Faivcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 
(1931) (tax regulations "are valid unless unreasonable or incon-
sistent with the statute"); cf International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 
U.S. 506, 514 (1922) (stating the following as to customs duties 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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deference doctrine began to appear shortly after World 
War II. Between then and 1984, when Chevron \Vas 
decided, more than a half dozen Supreme Court cases9 L1 
and numerous lower court cases considered deference in 
the tax context The Supreme Court's Nntionnl Muffler 
decision - perhaps the most fre(iuently cited case of this 
line and the case on which the Suiallorvs majority relied -
distilled the following factors from prior cases: 
In determining whether a particular regulation 
carries out the congressional mandate in a proper 
manner, we look to see whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, 
its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have 
particular force if it is a substantially contempora-
neous construction of the statute by those pre-
sumed to have been aware of congressional intent. 
If the regulation dates from a later period, the 
manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other 
relevant considerations are the length of time the 
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on 
it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpre-
tation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has 
devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-
enactments of the statute.91 
Many cases of this line distinguish between two types 
of regulations: legislative (also called substantive) and 
interpretive.92 Those terms can be confusing, hovvever. 
They have different meanings in tax than in administra-
tive law. In 1 tax, interpretive regulations are issued under 
section 7805(a)'s broad delegation to the Treasury to 
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement of [the code]" while legislative regulations are 
issued under a specific delegation within the particular 
code section.93 In contrast, in administrative law, an 
interpretive regulation is clarifying or advisory in that it 
"express[ es} an agency's intended course of action or its 
view of the meaning of a statute" vvhile a legislative 
regulation makes new, enforceable law, "creat[ingJ law 
just as the statute itself does, by changing existing rights 
and obligations."9.: To avoid the confusion that may arise 
from those different usages, this report follows Prof. 
Coverdale's suggested terminology.95 Thus, this report 
that the Court called "virtually [the] laying [of] a tax": "A 
regulation to be valid must be reasonable and must be consis-
tent with law"). 
90E.g., Co1nmissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 
(1981); Bingler v. /olmson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-751 (1969); Commis-
sioner v. South Texas Lun1ber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). 
91National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 
472, 477 (1979). 
92See generally Ellen P. Aprill, "Muffled Chevron: Judicial 
Review of Tax Regulations," 3 Fla. Tnx ReP. 51, 55-57 (1996); 
Michael Asimow, "Public Participation in the Adoption of 
Temporary Tax Regulations," 44 Tnx Lnru. 343, 350-362 (1991). 
'hE.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 
(1982). 
9
.+Bernard Schwartz, Administratir.ie Lazv 181 (3d ed. 1991) 
(quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see Chrysler Corp. u. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-302 (1979). 
95John F. Coverdale, "Court Review of Tax Regulations and 
Revenue Rulings in the Che1.1ron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L. ReP. 35, 52 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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typically refers to "generai authority" regulations instead 
of interpretative regulations, and to "specific authority" 
regulations instead of legislative regulations. • 
Numerous cases have stated that general authority tax 
regulations receive less deference than do specific author-
ity regulations.96 However, the significance of that dis-
tinction is questionable for three reasons. First, invoca-; 
tions of the distinction are more often ritualistic than 
outcome determinative. Attacks on general authority 
regulations usually fail, and attacks on specific authority 
regulations sometimes succeed.97 Indeed, it would be a 
challenge to identify an appreciable number of actual 
cases in which general authorit)r regulations were invali-
dated when they would likely have been upheld had 
they been specific authority regulations. Even Sr:uallows is 
not such a case. Oi1e of the majority's rationales was that 
the regulation at issue is inconsistent with the plain 
meaning of the statute.98 If so,99 the regulation would 
have been invalidated even had it been a specific author-
ity regulation. HJO 
Second, even if a difference exists in practice as well as 
rhetorically, that difference likely is small'"" To say 
general authority regulations receive less deference than 
do specific authority regulations may distract from the 
fact that the former still receive a lot of deference. 
Referring specifically to general authority tax regula-
tions, the Supreme Court remarked in a frequently cited 
case: 
We recognize that this Court is not in the business 
of administering the tax laws of this Nation. Con-
gress has delegated that task to the Secretary of the If-,, 
Treasury, 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), and regulations pro- • 
mulgated under his authority, if found to imple-
ment the congressional mandate in some reason-
able manner, must be upheld.1°2 
Similarly, the Third Circuit has said: "In the tax area, 
we are still required to treat regulations issued under a 
(1995); see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 
973, 978-979, Doc 98-12811, 98 TNT 76-8 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 961, Doc 98-32323, 98 TNT 212-4 (1998). 
96E.g., Rorunn Cos., Inc. u. Connnissioner, 452 U.S. 247, 253 
(1981). 
97E.g., Rite Aid Corp. n United States, 255 F.3d 1357, Doc 
2001-18688, 2001 TNT 132-10 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. 
Co1111nissio11er, 103 T.C. 656, Doc 94-10271, 94 TNT 224-11 (1994), 
rev'd, 87 F.3d 99, Doc 96-19729, 96 TNT 135-12 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(legislative regulation invalidated by Tax Court but validated on 
appeal). 
'!t>126 T.C. at 132-136. 
991 disagree with the majority's conclusion in this regard in 
Part \T.A. 
rnuA regulation (of any sort) that flouts the plain meaning of 
the statute fails step one of CheLiron. See C/1evro11, 467 U.S. at 843. 
It also would fail under the pre-ChePron tax-specific line of 
authority. 
im See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon Jr., and 
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individunls 46-5 
(3d ed. 2002) {noting the distinction "at least in theory; but in 
practice this dichotomy is ethereal, and taxpayers rarely succeed • 
in uRsetting regulations of either type"). 
1 2 U11ited States v. Cartzuright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (quo-
tation marks and citations omitted). 
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general grant of authority with broad deference, al-
though to a somewhat lesser degree than when Congress 
has made a specific delegation of authority in a specific 
statute."103 
Third, the two types of regulations are identical in an 
important respect. The Administrative Procedure Act 
prescribes notice and comment processes that agencies 
are to follow to promulgate binding rules.104 Interpretive 
rules (in the nontax sense) are expressly exempted from 
notice and comment requirements.105 As shown in Part 
IV.C below, whether a particular regulation has gone 
through the notice and comment process is a significant 
factor in determining the degree of deference it will 
receive. Significantly, the two kinds of tax regulations are 
essentially equal in that regard. Not only do specific 
authority regulations go through the notice and comment 
process, but virtually all general authority regulations go 
through it as well.106 
This tax-specific line of cases has retained vigor even 
after Chevron. As described in greater detail in Part IV.A 
below, post-Chevron tax cases have cited, as providing the 
controlling standard, Chevron alone, the National Muffler 
cases, or both in ways that defy confident categorization. 
National Muffler and the line of cases of which it is a part 
are discussed at length in my first report on Swallozus. I 
conclude that the case and the line are deferential, not 
hostile, to tax regulations. 107 
C. Effect on Actual Outcomes 
The Swallows majority posed the question whether the 
Supreme Court intended Chevron to replace the National 
Muffl.er line of cases as the standard for €,'Valuating the 
validity of tax regulations. It answered that question by 
adhering to the view expressed in a previous decision 
that "'the traditional, i.e., National Muffler standard, has 
not been [greatly] changed by Chevron, but has merely 
been restated [by it].'"JOs 
I agree that there is limited profit in endlessly teasing 
and torturing the verbal formulations of various stan-
dards. The spirit in which a standard is applied typically 
matters more than the precise wording of the standard. A 
deferential court applying National Muffler is more likely 
to upho\d a rule or regulation than is an active court 
applying Chevron. 109 Courts wishing to invalidate a rule 
103£.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 
135, Doc 94-10819, 94 TNT 240-6 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Hospital 
Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 140-141, Doc 2003-
23580, 2003 TNT 211-8 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813, 
Doc 2004-3710, 2004 TNT 36-8 (2004); Snozva v. Commissioner, 123 
F.3d 190, 197, Doc 97-24194, 97 TNT 163-8 (4th Cir. 1997) (after 
classifying the regulation at issue as interpretive not legislative, 
saying "the regulation is still entitled to considerable defer-
ence"). 
1
°'5 U.S.C. sections 553(b)-(e). 
rn5Id. section 553(b). 
106See proc. reg. section 601.601; IRM section 30(15). 
w7Johnson, supra note 6, Part V. 
ws126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995)) . 
w9See generally Mark Seidenfeld, "A Syncopated Chevron: 
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-95 (1994) 
(Footnote continued in next' column.) 
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or regulation under Chevron often achieve that result by 
finding clear at step one of the two-step analysis what 
others would have found ambiguous110 or by selectively 
applying indicia of reasonableness at step two.111 
I doubt that the choice of standard matters a great deal 
in most cases.112 However, some types of cases - includ-
ing mutated Szvallows - may be exceptions. The choice 
between Chevron and the National Muffler line may be 
outcome-significant in cases in which a general authority 
tax regulation contradicts prior cases. 113 
Skidnzore often produces less deference than Chevron,114 
and National Muffl.er has some structural and substantive 
similarity to Skid1nore. After setting out a more general 
standard, National Muffler lists six factors. 115 Skidmore too 
lists factors, 11 ro and there is overlap between the two lists. 
The Swallows majority found "consistency with prior case 
law" to be within the scope of the National Muffler 
factors,117 and Skid1nore's catchall language118 is broad 
enough to encompass a similar inquiry. 
Of course, reasonableness (Chevron's step two) also is 
extremely broad in scope. 11 C) Thus, another consideration 
(describing deferential and active courts in reference to Chev-
ron); see also Cynthia R. Farina, "Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State," 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
452, 453-454 (1989) (describing the deferential model and inde-
pendent judgment model of judicial behavior in interpreting 
statutes also interpreted by agencies). 
110See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., "The Supreme Court's New 
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence 
in the Administrative State," 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 750 (1995). 
111 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, and Jack M. 
Beermann, Administrative Lar.v: Cases and Materials 143 (5th ed. 
2006) (Step Two "has proved to be no less difficult than Step 
One"). 1 
112See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 
973, 981-983 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); 
David A. Brennan, "Treasury Regulations and Judicial Defer-
ence in the Post-Chevron Era," 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 387, 430 
(1997); Noel B. Cunningham and James R. Repetti, "Textualism 
and Tax Shelters," 24 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 47 (2004). 
113See 126 T.C. at 173 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
"in most cases, applying either National Muffler or Chevron will 
end up producing the same result" but that "the most important 
class of cases in which results under the two tests diverge is the 
one into which this case falls"). 
11
-±"Skidmore is commonly understood to be 'weak defer-
ence."' Jim Rossi, "Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skid-
more Within the Architecture of Chevron," 42 Wm. & Man; L. Rev. 
1105, 1109 (2001); see also Michael Asimow, "The Scope of 
Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agen-
cies," 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1194-1198 (1995); Colin S. Diver, 
"Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State," 133 U. 
Pa. L Rev. 549, 565 (1985) (both cited by Rossi, supra, at 1109 
n.10). 
115440 U.S. at 477. My first article criticized the Swallor.vs 
majority for letting attachment to the factors blur the deferential 
spirit and general standard of National Muffler. Johnson, supra 
note 6, Part V.B. 
116323 U.S. at 140, quoted supra at note 88. 
117126 T.C. at 137. 1 
1 L'>323 U.S. at 140 (referring to "all those factors which give 
[an a~ency's interpretation] power to persuade"). 
11
"The ambiguity of the term ureasonable" is such that courts 
typically accord substantial deference to agency constructions of 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
781 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
is of greater moment. As maintained in Part VI below, 
Brand X significantly shifts the needle towards an agency 
interpretation in cases of conflict between such an inter-
pretation and prior case law. Brand X said that its rule 
applies to "an agency construction otherwise entitled to 
Chevron deference.'' 120 Therefore, by choosing National 
Muffler over Chevron as the governing standard, the court 
reviewing a challenged regulation can, at least arguably, 
avoid giving the regulation the benefit of Brand X. 121 
IV. Applicability of Chevron 
Jn the early years after Chevron was decided, some 
questioned whether it applied at all in the tax context.122 
By now, it is clear that Chevron applies to at least some 
administrative interpretations of the code.123 It is gener-
ally agreed, for example, that Chevron applies to specific 
authority tax regulations.1 24 The Tax Court itself has so 
held in numerous cases.12s 
But the regulation at issue in Swallows is a general 
authority regulation. The Swallows majority questioned 
whether Chevron applies to general authority regula-
tions.126 That question is fairly asked because the cases 
addressing the issue thus far have hardly spoken with 
one voice.127 I summarize those cases below and then 
it when the word is used in a statute. E.g., Metrophones Tele-
com1ns., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1067 
(9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006); Capital 
Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
120125 S. Ct. at 2700. 
121 Another class of cases in which the choice may matter 
involves administrative inconsistency. National Muffler and Skid-
more seem more concerned with an agency's changing its mind 
than is Chevron. Compare National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477, and 
Skid1nore, 323 U.S. at 140, with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 and 863; 
see also Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.B.l (criticizing the Swallows 
majority's administrative inconsistency argument). 
For discussion of the related question whether the IRS can be 
held to a previous position under a governmental duty of 
consistency, see, e.g., Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, "Does the 
Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situ-
ated Taxpayers Similarly?," 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531 (2005); 
Lawrence Zelenak, "Should Courts Require the Internal Rev-
enue Service to Be Consistent?," 40 Tax L. Rev. 411 (1985). 
122See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 95, at 53-57; Mitchell M. 
Gans, "Deference and the End of Tax Practice," 36 Real Prop. 
Probate & Trust J. 731, 749-750 (2002). 
123See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 85, at 189. 
124See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, "Can Treasury Overrule the 
Supreme Court?," 84 B.U.L. Rev. 185, 210 (2004); Edward ). 
Schnee and W. Eugene Seago, "Deference Issues in the Tax Law: 
Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule-Or Does It?," 96 J. Tax'n 366, 
371 (2002); American Bar Association Section of Taxation Report 
on Judicial Deference {hereafter "ABA Deference Report"], 57 
Tax Law. 717, 737-738 (2004). 
125E.g., Carlos v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280, Doc 2004-
18624, 2004 TNT 183-9 (2004); Estate of Clause v. Commissioner, 
122 T.C. 115, 119, Doc 2004·2720, 2004 TNT 27-12 (2004); Square D 
Co. v. Comn1issioner, 118 T.C. 299, 307, Doc 2002-7591, 2002 TNT 
60·8 (2002), aff d, 438 F.3d 739, Doc 2006-2877, 2006 TNT 30-9 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
126126 T.C. at 131. 
127See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 117-118, Doc 
2002-20462, 2002 TNT 173-4 (2002) (Vasquez, )., dissenting); 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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describe the Supreme Court's teaching as to step zero. I 
then explain why I believe that the regulation at issue in 
Swallows is entitled to be analyzed through the Chevron .: 
framework. 
A. Case Law 
The Supreme Court has decided four post-Chevron 
cases involving the validity of general authority tax 
regulations: Boyle, Cottage Savings, Atlantic Mutual, and 
Boeing.128 The Court upheld the regulation in question in 
all four cases. Taking the cases as a whole, however, the 
Court neither clearly held nor clearly rejected that Chev-
ron provides the standard for determining such validity. 
In Boyle, the Court cited Chevron but not National Muf-
fler.129 In Cottage Savings, the Court cited National Muf-
fler's general language but not its six enumerated consid-
erations, 130 and it did not cite Chevron. 131 In Atlantic 
Mutual, the Court cited Chevron and Cottage Savings but 
not National Muffler. 132 In Boeing, the Court cited Cottage 
Savings but not Chevron or National Muffler. 133 In none of 
those cases did the Court explain why it was using the 
lines it was using or eschewing the lines it wasn't using. 
Given the Supreme Court's failure to provide clear 
guidance, it is not surprising that "the relationship be-
tween Chevron and National Muffler has long puzzled 
lower courts. " 134 Judge Holmes surveyed the circuits in 
his Swallows dissent. The circuits break down into three 
categories. Circuits applying Chevron to general authority 
tax regulations constitute the largest cluster, consisting of 
six circuits. Four circuits apply the National Muffler line. 
The question remains open in three circuits, 135 including 
the Third Circuit, to which Swallows has been appealed. .\ 
In a 1994 case, the Third Circuit said that general author- j' 
ity tax regulations receive less deference than specific 
authority regulations, but it left open the possibility that 
general authority regulations may qualify for Chevron 
Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 391 (1995) 
("Chevron has had a checkered career in the tax arena"). 
128United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Cottage Sav. Ass'n 
v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, Doc 98-12876, 98 TNT 77-8 (1998); 
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, Doc 2003-5648, 2003 TNT 
43.7 (2003). 
129469 U.S. at 247 n.4. But see ABA Deference Report, supra 
note 124, at 761 n.112 (suggesting that Boyle only weakly 
invoked Chevron). 
130See Part IILB supra. 
131499 U.S. at 560-561. 
132523 U.S. at 387 and 389; see Gans, supra note 122, at 750 
(stating that Atlantic Mutual "made it clear that Chevron's 
framework is applicable to interpretive regulations"); Polsky, 
supra note 124, at 209 and n.139 (stating that Atlantic Mutual 
"ap}il[ied] the Chevron methodology"). 
3537 U.S. at 448. 
134 ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at 763; see, e.g., 
General Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8, Doc 
2001-9634, 2001 TNT 65-18 (2d Cir. 2001), acq. in result, 2003-49 
!RB 1172; Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 787, 790, Doc 95-2224, 
95 TNT 35-12 (6th Cir. 1995). 
135126 T.C. at 180-181 (citing cases); see also Bankers Life & Cas. • 
Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 982 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 961 (1998); ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at 
763-766. 
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deference. 136 The Third Circuit has accorded Chevron 
deference to nontax regulations that have gone through 
the notice and comment process.137 
In light of the question raised by the Swallows majority, 
one might think that the Tax Court has rejected applica-
tion of Chevron to general authority regulations. But once 
again the picture is mixed. Sometimes the Tax Court has 
tested those regulations under the National Muffler line;138 
other times it has invoked Chevron. 139 Frequently it has 
referred to both.140 
That checkered history in the various courts hearing 
federal tax cases gives rise to two conclusions. First, to 
produce that division, there must be significant consid-
erations (or ingrained habits) on both sides of the issue. 
Second, arguing, as I will, for the application of Chevron 
to the regulation at issue in Swallows is not foreclosed by 
a settled judicial consensus. 
B. Considerations Governing Step Zero 
As noted above, the key cases for Chevron step zero 
analysis are Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart, and 
Brand X, none of which are tax cases. In Haggar, the Court 
accorded Chevron deference to a Customs Service regula-
tion. The discursive style of the opinion makes it hard to 
identify a clear step-zero test. However, the Court men-
tioned that the regulation was "intend[ed] to bind the 
public," that it helped "to define the legal relations 
between the Government and regulated entities," and 
especially that the Customs Service "utilized the notice-
and-comment rulemaking process before issuing the 
regulations. "141 
Christensen denied Chevron entitlement to an agency 
interpretation "contained in an opinion letter, not one 
arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as 
those in opinion letters - like interpretations contained 
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not 
warrant Chevron-style deference."1-i2 
Mead denied Chevron entitlement to a tariff classifica-
tion contained in a letter issued by the Customs Service. 
The Court said: 
administrative implementation of a particular 
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference 
136E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Com1nissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 
135-136 and n.23 (1994). 
"'E.g., Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 807 (1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 870 (1999). 
138£.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 219, 234, Doc 
2004-16911, 2004TNT162-7 (2004), aff d, 137 Fed. Appx. 373, Doc 
2005-14477, 2005 TNT 129-7 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. 
Latos v. Commissioner, 126 S. Ct. 1595 (2006). 
139E.g., Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 346, 346, Doc 
98-17478, 98 TNT 106-11 (1998). 
140E.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 69-70 (2002); 
Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589, 597-598 (2000), acq., Notice 
'.2.003-72, 2003-2 C.B. 964; Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Commissioner, 115 
T.C. 1, 7-9, Doc 2000-19280, 2000 TNT 138-17 (2000); Hospiial 
Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 107 TC. 116, 134 (1996), affd, 348 
F.3d 136, 140 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004). 
1
"526 U.S. at 388-389. 
u 2529 U.S. at 587. 
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when it appears that Congress delegated authority 
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise 
of that authority ... Delegation of such authority 
may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indi-
cation of a comparable congressional intent. 143 
The classification did not go through the notice-and-
comment process. "As significant as notice-and-comment 
is in pointing to Chevron authority,"144 its absence was not 
dispositive. The Court has "sometimes found reasons for 
Chevron deference even when no such administrative 
formality was required and none was afforded." 145 Also 
important, among other factors, were the diffuse author-
ity for issuing those classifications and the volume of 
those classifications. "Any suggestion that rulings in-
tended to have the force of law are being churned out at 
a rate of 10,000 a year at the agency's 46 scattered offices 
is simply self-refuting."146 
Barnhart accorded Chevron entitlement to an agency 
interpretation originally set out in a manual, a ruling, and 
a letter. The Court said: 
the fact that the Agency ... reached its interpreta-
tion through means less formal than "notice and 
comment" rulemaking ... does not automatically 
deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference 
otherwise its due. . . . Indeed, Mead pointed to 
instances in which the Court has applied Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations that did not 
emerge out of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing. . . . It indicated that whether a court should 
give such deference depends in significant part 
upon the interpretive method used and the nature 
of the question at issue. . . . And it disc'ussed at 
length why Chevron did not require deference in the 
circumstances there present - a discussion that 
would have been superfluous had the presence or 
absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking been 
dispositive.147 
The Court listed the following factors in support of 
according Chevron entitlement to the agency's interpreta-
tion: the long-standing nature of the interpretation, the 
respect usually accorded an agency's interpretation of its 
own rules, "the interstitial nature of the legal question, 
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the 
question to administration of the statute, the complexity 
of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of 
time."148 
Most recently, step zero was revisited in Brand X 
although in Justice Scalia's dissent and justice Breyer's 
w533 U.S. at 226-227. 
144Id. at 230-231. 
145Id. at 231 (citing NatjonsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. 
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-257 (1995)) . 
1
'
6533 U.S. at 233. 147535 U.S. at 221-222. 
148Id. at 522. 
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concurrence, not in the opinion for the Court. Justice 
Scalia read Mead thusly: "Some unspecified degree of 
formal process [is] required- or [is] at least the only safe 
harbor."149 He proposed instead a broader test: "Any 
agency position that plainly 4as the approval of the 
agency head" should be entitled to Chevron deference. 150 
In Justice Breyer's view, however, Mead teaches that: 
An agency action qualifies for Chevron deference 
when Congress has explicitly or implicitly del-
egated to the agency the authority to "fill" a 
statutory "gap," including an interpretive gap cre-
ated through an ambiguity in the language of a 
statute's provisions. The Court said in Mead that 
such delegation "may be shown in a variety of ways, 
as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemal<lng, or by some other 
indication of a comparable congressional intent. The 
court explicitly stated that the absence of notice-
and-comment rulemaking did "not decide the 
case," for the Court has "sometimes found reasons 
for Chevron deference even when no such adminis-
trative formality was required and none was af-
forded." And the Court repeated that it "has recog-
nized a variety of indicators that Congress would 
expect Chevron deference."1s1 
Justice Breyer thus concluded that "the existence of a 
formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference to 
an agency's interpretation of a stahtte."152 Formal rule-
making "is not a necessary condition because an agency 
might arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a con-
gressional enactment in other ways, including ways that 
Justice Scalia mentions."153 However, formal rulemaking 
"is not a sufficient condition because Congress may have 
intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpre-
tation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the 
agency uses to arrive at that interpretation, say, where an 
unusually basic legal question is at issue."154 
C. Argument 
I believe that virtually all general authority tax regu-
lations should be Chevron-entitled, a case I intend to make 
in a future article. In this report, I undertake only the 
narrower, easier task of maintaining that the regulation at 
issue in Swallows qualifies under Chevron step zero. There 
are six reasons why that regulation should be Chevron-
entitled. Three are common to all or nearly all general 
authority tax regulations, and three are particular to this 
regulation. 
First, nearly all final general authority tax regulations 
go through the notice and comment process. 155 As noted 
'
49125 S. Ct. at 2718-2719. 
150Id. at 2719 n.10. 
151 Id. at 2712 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
1s21a. 
153Jd. 
154Jd. at 2713 (emphasis in original). 
155Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); proc. reg. sections 
601.601(a) and (b). See generally Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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in Part I.A, the Swallows regulation went through it. That 
factor may not be dispositive, but it is close to it. As seen 
in Part !V.B above, Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart, 
and the Breyer concurrence, as well as the Scalia dissent 
in Brand X, all adverted to that consideration as impor-
tant to Chevron entitlement. 
Second, general authority tax regulations receive ap-
proval at the highest relevant administrative level. They 
are "prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by 
the Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate."156 That 
contrasts significantly with the highly decentralized (46 
separate offices) approval and issuance process for the 
classification letters denied Chevron entitlement by 
Mead.'57 In Justice Scalia's view, approval by the agency 
head suffices to qualify an agency interpretation for 
Chevron treatment,1ss 
Third, whatever "force of law" means, general author-
ity tax regul~tions probably have it. Christensen adverted 
to "force of law" stahts.159 So did Mead, 160 but in a fashion 
that "squarely rejected a possible reading of Christensen: 
that agency interpretations lacking force of law, or not 
preceded by formal procedures, would always [fail to 
receive Chevron treatment]."161 Barnhart - which ac-
corded Chevron difference to an interpretation even in its 
agency manual phase of development162 - made it clear 
that force-of-law status is helpful but not indispensable to 
Chevron qualification.163 
I advance a force-of-law argument with some hesi-
tancy because no one knows for sure what the phrase 
means.164 Nonetheless, general authority tax regulations 
in general and the Swallows regulation in particular likely 
have the .force of law, however that concept is defined. 
General authority regulations are intended to have gen-
eral applicability,165 bind taxpayers and the IRS,'66 are 
and Procedure paras. 3.02[1 J and [2] (rev. 2d ed. stud. ed. 2002); 
Paul F. Schmid, "The Tax Regulations Making Process - Then 
and Now," 24 Tax. Law. 541 (1971); Laurens Williams, "Prepara-
tion and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations," 8 
USC Tax Inst. 733 (1956). 
156Proc. reg. section 601.601(a)(l); see also Bittker, McMahon, 
and Zelenak, supra note 101, at 46-5. 
157533 U.S. at 232-233; see Hospital Corp. of America v. Commis-
sioner, 348 F.3d 136, 144-145 (6th Cir. 2003) (according Chevron 
deference to tax regulations "arrived at centrally by the Treasury 
Department, after careful consideration" and contrasting those 
regulations with the Mead letters), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813 
(2004). 
"'Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2719 n.10 (Scalia, )., dissenting). 
"
9529 U.S. at 587. 
'
60533 U.S. at 226. 161Sunstein, supra note 85, at 214-215. 
'
62535 U.S. at 221. 
163Sunstein, supra note 85, at 216. 
164See, e.g., Richard W. Murphy, "Judicial Deference, Agency 
Commitment, and Force of Law," 66 Ohfo St. L.]. 1013, 1016 
(2005) (calling the concept "incoherent"). 
165Saltzman, supra note 155, at 3-7; see Murphy, supra note 
164, at 1017 (force of law exists when the agency interpretation 
applies uniformly across time and parties). 
166See General Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 134 (both 
parties conceded that they are bound by a valid regulation); 
Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak, supra note 101, at 46-5; Mitchell 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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time consuming and costly to change because of the steps 
required to promulgate and amend them,16 7 and entail 
sanctions for their violation. I68 
There is a pre-Christensen body of cases that discusses 
the phrase "force of law" in connection with tax regula-
tions and lower-level IRS interpretations. Several deci-
sions stated that general authority regulations have force-
of-law status, either without apparent qualification169 or 
under particular circumstances, such as the regulation 
being of long standing and having survived successive 
statutory reenactments. 170 I intend to explore that body of 
cases in detail in a future article. For now, I note the cases 
but put limited reliance on them because the cases do not 
speak with a single voice and because it is not clear that 
Christensen, Mead, and the earlier cases had the same 
thing in mind when using the phrase "force of law." 
The three remaining arguments for Chevron entitle-
ment are particular to the Swallows regulation. Those 
arguments emerge from additional considerations for 
such entitlement mentioned in Barnhart. 171 Of those con-
siderations, the following bear with particular force on 
our situation. 
Fourth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the 
importance of the question to administration of the 
statute," one of the Barnhart factors. 172 Section 882(c)(2) 
expressly conditions taking deductions on filing returns. 
As shown in Part II.A, the courts have held that, in light 
of that requirement, "it is inconceivable that Congress 
contemplated ... that taxpayers could wait indefinitely 
to file returns."173 As shown in Part V.A below, the 
Rogovin, "The Four R's; Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and 
Retroactivity,"143 Taxes 756, 763 (1965); see United States v. Haggar 
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 388 (1999) (noting that the Chevron-
entitled regulation was intended "to bind the public" and "to 
define legal relations between the Government and regulated 
entities"); Sunstein, supra note 85, at 222 (force of law may exist 
when an agency position binds private parties and perhaps the 
agency itself). 
167See Saltzman, supra note 155, para. 3.02[2] (detailing the 
steps); Mu:rphy, supra note 164, at 1017 (maintaining that those 
facts demonstrate agency commitment to the position indicative 
of force of law). 
168See section 6662(b)(l) ("disregard of tax.rules and regula-
tions" can be a basis for imposition of the accuracy-related 
penalty). But see ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at 
726-727 (questioning that position). Also, of course, violation of 
the Swallows regulation subjects the taxpayer to the loss of 
otherwise allowable deductions. See Thomas W. Merrill and 
Kathryn Tongue Watts, "Agency Rules With the Force of Law; 
The Original Convention," 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002) (arguing 
that "force of law" was once defined by the imposition of 
sanctions for violation, and exploring the desirability of restor-
ing that convention). 
169E.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 28 (1983). 170E.g., Centun; Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 160 
(8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); Community Bank 
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 789, 791-792 (1982), affd, 819 F.2d 940 
(9th Cir. 1987); McSltain v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 154, 162 (1977). 
171535 U.S. at 522; see text accompanying note 148 supra. 
m535 U.S. at 222. 
l 73Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703-704; see also Espinosa, 107 
T.C. at 157. 
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18-month rule in the regulation advances the congres-
sional purpose of inducing foreign corporations to file 
returns. 
Fifth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the com-
plexity of [the] administration [of the statute]," another 
Barnhart factor. 17" The Swallows majority stated: "The 
judiciary has enough expertise and experience to ascer-
tain congressional intent with respect to I the word 'man-
ner' in the statute]."175 But there are more dimensions 
that had to be considered than just that. Once the prior 
cases, after considering "manner" and the rest of the 
statute, had decided that section 882(c)(2) contemplates 
some timing limitation, Treasury and the IRS had to 
determine how to define that limitation - that is, where 
to draw the line. In so doing, Treasury and the IRS had to 
consider the importance of receiving. returns, the possi-
bilities of obtaining information in other ways, the degree 
of administrative burden in time and expense that pur-
suing other ways would entail, and what degrees of 
burden foreign taxpayers would bear as a result of 
different possibilities regarding where the line could be 
drawn. Assessing and balancing those considerations 
entailed complexity, required administrative expertise 
(another Barnhart consideration), 176 and involved matters 
of policy that are properly the province of agencies, not of 
the courts.177 
Sixth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the inter-
stitial nature of the legal question," another Barnhart 
factor. 178 The Swallows majority expressed its view that 
the regulation constituted "an unauthorized assumption 
by the Secretary of major policy decisions properly made 
by Congress: e.g., here, a foreign corporation's forfeiture 
of deductions absent its filing of a timely tax return."179 
Were the majority right in that, the regulation would be 
invalid. The Supreme Court has taught that deference 
does not extend as far as to allow an agency to make 
fundamental decisions that properly are the responsibil-
ity of Congress. 180 
However, the majority is wrong. Congress made the 
decision that those deductions are forfeited if the foreign 
corporation fails to file returns, and Congress wrote that 
decision into section 882(c)(2). As shown in Part II.A, the 
courts held that a timing limitation is implicit in Con-
gress's decision. Thus, in promulgating the 18-month 
rule, Treasury and the IRS were not making the "major 
policy decision." They were only filling a gap necessary 
to implement the decision Congress already had made. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts 
should respect such interstitial administrative actions. "If 
the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in 
174See supra note 171. 175126 T.C. at 136. 
176See supra note 171. 
177E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-845; Redlark v. Commissioner, 
141 F.3d 936, 939, Doc 98-12203. 98 TNT 71-3 (9th Cir. 1998). 
178See supra note 171. 179126 T.C. at 136; see•also id. at 147-148. 
180E.g., Whitman v. Anterican Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457 
(2001); FDA v. Brozvn & Willianison Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 
218 (1994). 
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a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's 
revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment 
'controlling weight.'''181 
The Suiallows majority committed a related error. It 
stated: "Congress is the only body that may amend the 
relevant text. "182 Similarly, in other cases, the Tax Court 
has said that "the Secretary may not usurp the authority 
of Congress by adding restrictions to a statute which are 
not there."183 
Those statements are correct, but they apply to a 
context different from Swallows. The Supreme Court 
defined that context: When "the provisions of the act are 
unambiguous, and its directions specific, there is no 
power to amend it by regulation. "184 However, "where 
the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construc-
tion, a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method 
of its application to specific cases not only is permissible 
but is to be given great weight by the courts."185 Swallows 
fits the latter category because the statute implies a 
timing limitation but does not set the terms of that 
limitation. In cases applying Chevron and upholding 
challenged regulations, the Tax Court has held that: 
to invoke these passages from our decisions for the 
general proposition that regulations may not add 
rules not found in the statute and not precluded by 
the statute is to misread them. Indeed, supplemen-
tation of a statute is a necessary and proper part of 
the Secretary's role in the administration of our tax 
laws.186 i 
In summary, the regulation at issue in Swallows passes 
step zero for some of the same reasons that all or nearly 
all general authority tax regulations should so pass: The 
regulation went through the notice and comment pro-
cess, it was approved at the highest relevant administra-
tive level, and it probably has the force of law. Also, the 
Swallows regulation is supported by considerations iden-
tified in Barnhart, specifically the importance of the 
timing limitation to administration of the statute, the 
complexity of the matters bearing on when to fix the 
terminal date, and the interstitial nature of drawing the 
timing line. Accordingly, the regulation is qualified to be 
analyzed under Chevron. 
V. Validity of the Regulation Under Chevron 
If, as argued in Part rv, the validity of the Swallows 
regulation is entitled to be analyzed under the Chevron 
framework, the next task is to scrutinize the regulation 
181NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 
257 (1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 132126 T.C. at 148 n.31. 
183Western Waste Inds. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 472, 476, Doc 
95·3943, 95 TNT 73-7 (1995) (citing cases). 
is-1Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936). 
185Id. at 446. 
186Hachette USA, Inc. v. Con1missioner, 105 T.C. 234, 251, Doc 
95-8926, 95TNT188-30 (1995), affd, 87 F.3d 43, Doc 96·18801, 96 
TNT 127-13 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Greenberg Bros. Partnership #4 
v. Co1nmissioner, 111 T.C. 198, 206-207, Doc 98-26388, 98 TNT 
164-12 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Cine111a '84 v. Co111missioner, 294 F.3d 
432, Doc 2002-12370, 2002 TNT 187·17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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under the two-step analysis. In my opinion, the regula-
tion passes step-one scrutiny because section 882(c)(2) ••. 
does not unambiguously preclude an 18-month timing 
limitation, and it passes step-two scrutiny because the 
18-month limitation is within the range of reason. 
A. Step One 
Under step one, no deference is accorded to th€ 
agency's interpretation if "Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress 
is clear, that is the end of the matter; [the court and the 
agency] must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress."187 Justice Scalia noted a major ques-
tion regarding step one: "How clear is clear? It is here, if 
Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over 
acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be 
fought." 188 There has been little judicial consistency in 
that regard. Different courts have treated step one with 
different degrees of stringency. 189 In part, at least, those 
outcomes may be unavoidable since "it may be 
that ... the strict dichotomy between clarity and ambigu-
ity is artificial, that what we have is a continuum, a 
probability of meaning."190 
While that history inspires caution as to any conclu-
sions, I believe the regulation at issue in Swallows passes 
step-one muster. Congress, in section 882(c)(2), did not 
unambiguously express its intention to exclude an 18-
month timing rule. Even Anglo-American, the polestar for 
the Swallows majority, acknowledged that as a linguistic 
matter, the statutory term "manner" "is a comprehensive 
term, and includes, but is more comprehensive than, • 
'method, mode, or way1"' and that in nontax cases, -l 
"manner" has been construed sometimes to include and ! 
sometimes not to refer to time.191 
Although some judges have a penchant for using 
dictionary definitions,192 it is widely recognized that, for 
step one, statutory meanings depend on context.193 
Anglo-American concluded that, in the context of the 
187Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 188 Antonin Scalia, "Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law," 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520-521. 
189Prof. Seidenfeld has observed: "To the extent that Chevron 
has generated dissension among lower courts, the dispute 
primarily concerns the vigor with which judges inquire, at step 
one, whether a statute has resolved the question addressed by 
the agency." Seidenfeld, supra note 109, at 94-95; see also Note, 
'"How Clear Is Clear' in Chevron's Step One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
1687, 1687, 1691-1692 (2005). 
'
90PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
19138 BTA at 714. 
192See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 & 
2223 n.7 (2006) (plurality opinion); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern 
Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874 (1999); National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992); 
American Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1381 n.5, Doc 
2001-22501, 2001 TNT 165·6 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See generally Ellen P. 
Aprill, "The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the 
Supreme Court," 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 275 (1988). 
193£.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, •... 
133 (2000) ("the words of a statute must be read in their context 
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme"); 
United States v. Riuerside Bayvieu1 Hmnes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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predecessor of section 882(c)(2), "manner" does not 
include time, 19-± and the Swallows majority concluded 
that, throughout the code, "Congress has consistently 
used the word 'time' together with the word 'manner' 
when it intended to include the meanings of both words 
in a single taxing section."195 
Judge Holmes maintained that there are counter-
examples in the code in which "manner" has been 
understood to include a time element.196 Be that as it may, 
I wish to advance a more fundamental case. I believe the 
regulation would survive step-one scrutiny even if the 
Swallows majority, rather than judge Holmes, is correct as 
to the word "manner." That's because statutory lan-
guage, although obviously important, is not the sole 
measure of "the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress." Statutory purpose is important. In Swallows, 
that purpose supports a timing limitation. Moreover, the 
canons of statutory construction also are significant. In 
Swallows, the canon in favor of interpreting statutes to 
avoid absurd results supports a timing limitation. 
1. Statutory purpose. Step one requires considering the 
congressional purpose. In addition to considering the 
"words of the statute ... read in context [and] the stat-
ute's place in the overall statutory scheme," the court 
should consider "the problem Congress sought to solve" 
in determining whether Congress's intent unambigu-
ously forecloses the agency's interpretation.197 The step-
one inquiry ceases "if the statutory language is unam-
biguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent." 198 Indeed, "it is a well-established canon of 
statutory construction that a court should go beyond the 
literal language of a statute if reliance on that language 
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute."199 
In assessing whether section 882(c)(2) unambiguously 
precludes a timing rule, it is worth noting that the BTA, 
(1985) (finding a statutory term inherently ambiguous despite 
its seeming to be clear at the purely linguistic level); Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 861. 
i 9-±33 BTA at 715. 
195126 T.C. at 132. 
196ld. at 165. 
"'Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006); PDK 
Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Snowa 
v. Commissioner, 123 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 1997); Nolle v. 
Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1137-1138, Doc 93-8870, 93 TNT 
172-12 (5th Cir. 1993). 
198Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (emphasis 
added) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Gorospe v. 
Commissioner, 446 F.3d 1014, 1016, Doc 2006-8564, 2006 TNT 
86-10 (9th Cir. 2006). 
199Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see, 
e.g., Brozvn v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 194 (1857); Prophit v. 
Com1nissioner, 57 T.C. 507, 510-511 (1972), affd per curiam, 470 
F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1973). In the frequently quoted language of 
'Learned Hand, "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and 
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some 
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imagi-
native discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."Cabell v. 
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 
(1945). 
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the Tax Court, and the Fourth Circuit all agreed that it 
does not. As discussed in Part II, in Taylor Securities, 
Ardbern, Blenheim, Georday, Espinosa, and InverWorld, 
those courts held that the statute, far from prohibiting a 
timing limitation, contemplates one. The reason for their 
view is the purpose behind the statute. 
Section 882(c)(2) expressly conditions availability of 
deductions on the filing of a return. Congress imposed 
that condition to provide a strong incentive for foreign 
corporations to file returns200 and to mitigate the formi-
dable obstacles to effectively applying the federal income 
tax to foreign corporations. 201 Anglo-A1nerican was con-
cerned about the potentially harsh consequences of de-
nying deductions.202 Later cases observed that that was 
precisely the point - the important administrative pur-
pose of obtaining returns is furthered by the in terrore1n 
effect of the deniaJ."n 
In view of the statute's specifically requiring that 
returns be filed, "it is inconceivable that Congress 
contemplated ... that taxpayers could wait indefinitely 
to file returns and [still be allowed to claim 
deductions]."204 By providing a bright-line demarcation 
for when returns are too late, the regulation's 18-month 
rule advances the reason Congress wrote section 882(c)(2) 
into the code. 205 
In a portion of its opinion potentially relevant to step 
one,206 the Swallows majority said: "As to the 18-month 
period set forth in the regulations, it is not only arbitrary 
but without any statutory basis at all. . . . Where [the 
rule] came from, we do not know."207 That remark 
ignores the Supreme Court's teaching in a delinquency 
penalty tax case that "deadlines are inherently arbitrary; 
fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish 
necessary results."208 Moreover, the majority fractures the 
step-one inquiry. Step one asks whether the statute 
unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, 
not whether the agency's interpretation can be traced to 
some affirmative basis set out in the statute. That the 
timing rule in the regulation advances the statutory 
purpose is sufficient justification for it. 
2. 0 Absurd results" canon. Chevron stated that, in con-
sidering whether "Congress had an intention on the 
precise question at issue," the court should "employ 
traditional tools of statutory construction."209 Those tools 
200E.g., Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703. 
201 B/en'1eim, 125 F.2d at 909. 
20238 BTA at 715. 
203E.g., Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157. 
20
-±raylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703-704. 
205See Johnson, supra note 6, Part IV.A. 
206Tue observation appears in a section entitled "Plain Mean-
ing of the Relevant Text" 126 T.C. at 132-136. That section 
follows on the heels of the majority's statement that the case 
would come out the same under either Chevron or National 
Muffler, id. at 131, and it p'recedes the majority's National Muffler 
analysis . 
267Id. at 135 n.17. 
208United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985). 
lcN467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
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include the canons of construction.210 That text - for tax 
law - is not all-conquering and can be trumped by 
canons is powerfully underlined by Coltec, an important 
recent decision. 211 In that case, the IRS attacked a tax 
shelter on statutory (sections 357 and 358) and economic 
substance grounds. The Court of Federal Claims held for 
the taxpayer in all respects, strongly endorsing textual-
ism, if not literalism.212 The Federal Circuit vacated the 
decision. It agreed with the trial court that the taxpayer 
had complied with the literal terms of the statutes, but it 
held that the IRS could nonetheless prevail because of the 
economic substance doctrine, saying, "The economic 
substance doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction 
that are employed in circumstances where the literal 
terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate purpose of 
the statute."213 
Particularly relevant in the Swallows context is the 
canon that statutes should be construed so avoid produc-
ing absurd results. The absurdity canon is well estab-
lished. "From the earliest days of the Republic, the 
Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges 
may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a 
given application would otherwise produce 'absurd' 
results. . . . Indeed, the absurdity doctrine has been one 
of the few fixed points in the Court's frequently shifting 
interpretive regimes."214 The Court has applied the ab-
surdity canon in many cases. 21s Even textualist judges 
generally agree that "interpretations of a statute which 
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if 
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative 
purpose are available."216 
2 wsee, e.g., Wisconsin Departinent of Revenue v. William Wrig-
ley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 230 (1992) (stating that the "de minimis 
non curnt lex" canon "is part of the established background of 
legal principles against which all enactments are adopted"); 
Dole v. United Steelu1orkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (applying the 
"noscitur n sociis" canon at step one). 
211 Coltec Inds., Inc. v. United States, 2006-2 U.S.T.C. para. 
50,389, Doc 2006-13276, 2006 TNT 134-10 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 
vacating and remnnding 62 Fed. Cl. 716, Doc 2004-21316, 2004 TNT 
214-16 (2004). For discussion of Coltec and other authorities, see 
Lee A. Sheppard, "A More Intelligent Economic Substance 
Doctrine," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 325. 
212 As to differences between textualism and literalism, see 
William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Poltiical Language and 
the Political Process para. 5.04 (4th ed. 2005). 
2132006-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,100. 
214John E Manning, "The Absurdity Doctrine," 116 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2387, 2388 (2003). See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Stntutory 
Interpretation 267-71 (2d ed. 2006); Popkin, supra note 212, at 
31-33 and 254-59 (describing the golden rule of avoiding absurd 
results). 
215E.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 454 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 
509-510 (1989); Un1ted States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948); 
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-487 (1868); see also Public 
Cit. v. Unzted States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-471 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
216Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) 
(Rehnquist, J., writing for the Court); see Manning, supra note 
214, at 2388. 
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An absurd result would obtain were section 882(c)(2) 
not backstopped by a timing limitation. Instead of filing 
by a date certain, the foreign corporation could "wait and 
see." Perhaps waiting to file the return until after the trial 
court's decision becomes final would be too late because 
of the rule of res judicata.21 7 Short of that, however, great 
delay and protraction would be possible. If section 
882(c)(2) were interpreted to exclude any timing limita-
tion, the foreign corporation could wait until contacted 
by the IRS, still wait until the IRS issued a notice of 
deficiency, and wait longer still until some time after it 
filed a Tax Court petition challenging the notice of 
deficiency. 218 If there is no time limit, the corporation 
could still claim available deductions despite the delay. 
To say that a statute, the purpose of which is to encourage 
the filing of returns, permits that result would be absurd. 
The absurdity would be compounded if one consid-
ered the effect of that outcome on IRS enforcement of the 
statute. The IRS's enforcement incentive would be con-
siderably eroded if an audit, a deficiency notise, and the 
Tax Court's pleadings could be undone by a subsequent 
return. 
A parallel exists for adjustment clauses under the gift 
tax. Under those clauses, the amount of noncash property 
transferred from the donor to the donee is adjusted 
downward (to an amount within the annual exclusion 
limit) if the IRS audits and determines that the value of 
the property exceeds the annual exclusion under section 
2503(b ). If those clauses were effective, the IRS' s incentive 
to audit woµld be greatly reduced since the result of the 
audit would be that there was no deficiency. For that 
reason, the IRS takes the position that the clauses are 
invalid as contrary to public policy,219 and the courts 
have upheld that position. 220 That parallel emphasizes 
the absurdity of allowing IRS enforcement against delin-
quent foreign corporations to be undercut by a largely 
open-ended filing regime. 
3. Summary. The statutory term "manner" is linguisti-
cally ambiguous, and its meaning under the code is 
arguable. In any event, a timing limitation is implicit in 
the statutory purpose, and excluding that limitation 
would produce absurd results. If the validity of some 
timing rule is accepted, the 18-month rule is not un-
ambiguously precluded by the statute because section 
882(c)(2) does not set or bar any specific time period. 
Accordingly, the regulation at issue in Swallows passes 
scrutiny under step one of Chevron. 
217See section 7481 (finality of Tax Court decisions). 
21 b'The Tax Court petition would not have to allege that the 
return had been filed. It could be amended later to claim the 
deductions after the return had been filed. The opportunity to 
amend a pleading is not infinite. However, "leave [to amend a 
pleading] shall be given freely when justice so requires." Tax Ct. 
R. 41(a). 
219 E.g., Rev. Rul. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300. 
220E.g., Co111n1issio11er v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827-828 (4th Cir. 
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944); Ward v. Co111111issioner, 87 
T.C. 78. 110-114 (1986). 
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B. Step Two 
If an agency position survives step one, it often is 
thought, it is highly likely to be found reasonable at step 
two.221 Nonetheless, it would be unwise for an agency to 
take step two lightly. Some prominent cases have been 
resolved adversely to agencies at step two. 222 
Although the step-two inquiry can sometimes be 
challenging, I do not believe that it is in mutated Swal-
lows. The regulation at issue easily passes muster as 
reasonable. We have assumed that the prior cases estab-
lished a "date of SFR" termination. But that date, while it 
may fall within the range of reason, does not define the 
boundaries of that range. An important teaching of 
Chevron regarding step two is that "the court need not 
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it 
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construc-
tion, or even the reading the court would have reached if 
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceed-
ing."223 
At least in part, "the 'reasonableness' of an agency's 
construction depends on the construction's 'fit' with the 
statutory language as well as its conformity to statutory 
purposes."224 The regulation's 18-month rule and the 
assumed case law rule regarding the date of SFR are 
indistinguishable in terms of their fit with the language 
of section 882(c)(2). The regulation's rule is superior to 
the case law's rule in conformity to the purpose behind 
section 882(c)(2). The regulation provides the more de-
finitive rule. A time certain has a greater in terrorem effect 
than does an event (the SFR) that may come soon, late, or 
not at all.225 It is possible that, in some cases, the IRS 
could prepare an SFR in less than 18 months from the 
return due date, in which case the regulation would 
provide a longer period than the assumed case law 
rule.226 In far more cases, 18 months will be shorter than 
the assumed case law period. That too will further the 
statutory purpose by encouraging more prompt compli-
ance. 227 
221 See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 
973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); Conti-
nental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department ofTransp., 84~ F.2d 1444, 1453 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Seidenfeld, supra note 109, at 96; "Develop-
ments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of 
Standing and Deference to the Agency," 4 Adniin. L.J. 113, 124 
(comments of Judge Stephen Williams). 
222E.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Abbott 
Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
819 (1991). 
223467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
"'Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
225See Johnson, supra note 6, Part IV.A. 
226126 T.C. at 162 (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("The 18-month 
, grace period might be shorter or longer than the old judicially 
construed one. It is undeniably more definite.") (footnote omit-
ted). 
227Nor can it be said that this would be accomplished at the 
price of an unreasonable burden on taxpayers. An 18-month 
grace period hardly is excessively onerous. See Johnson, supra 
note 6, Part IV.B. 
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VI. Validity of the Regulation Under Brand X 
Brand X is a major administrative law decision. 22s 
Because it's so recent, however, important questions 
raised by the case remain to be answered. TI1is section 
considers Brand X, first generally, then in the mutated 
Swallows context. I believe that, under Bmnd X, the 
regulation at issue in Swallows should control over the 
assumed contrary rule emanating from the prior case law. 
A. Brand X 
Before Chevron, an interpretation of a statute by the 
Supreme Court generally was binding on agencies under 
the rule of stare decisis.'229 As many commentators have 
noted, Chevron created a tension between its rule of 
deference and the doctrine of stare decisis. 230 The tensions 
between administrative flexibility on one hand, and 
stability, reliance, and legitimacy on the other hand, 
generated significant commentary in both administrative 
law231 and tax law232 even before the Brand X decision 
was handed down. 
Initially, stare decisis appeared ascendant under a tril-
ogy of 1990s Supreme Court cases.2 " The contours of the 
rule were controversial, however. "Although the Su-
preme Court ... concluded that its ou111 precedents trump 
Chevron, it ... frequently upheld agency interpreta-
tions ... at odds with existing lower court precedent."23" 
228See, e.g., Randolph J. May, 11 Defining Deference Down: 
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference," 58 Ad111i11. L. 
Rev. 429, 431 (2006). Other commentary on Brand X includes 
Kathryn A. Watts, "Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie 
Doctrine," 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2007); Note, 
"Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?" 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (2006). ' 
229See Polsky, supra note 124, at 199-209. 
230E.g., Paul A. Dame, "Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skid-
more; Do Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule 
Courts?," 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 405 (2002); Richard W. Murphy. 
11 A 'New' Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference 
and Agency Interpretive Freedom," 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2004); 
Timothy Zick, "Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and 
the Power to 'Say What the Law Is,"' 59 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 839, 
841-842 (2002). 
231 Id. See also, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, "Provisional 
Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymak-
ing," 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1272 (2002); David H.E. Becker, "judicial 
Review of INS Adjudication: When May the Agency Make 
Sudden Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decision Retroac-
tively?" 52 Admin. L. Rev. 219 (2000); David M. Gossett, "Chev-
ron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes," 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1997). 
232See Polsky, supra note 124. For further discussion, see 
Littriello v. United States, 2005WL1173277, Doc 2005-12029, 2005 
TNT 106-20 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (on appeal to the Sixth Circuit); 
Brant J. Hellwig and Gregg D. Polsky, "The Employment Tax 
Challenge to the Check-the-Box Regulations," Tax Notes, May 
29, 2006, p. 1039. 
233Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996); Ledt111ere, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1992); Mais/in Indus., ll.S., Inc. u. 
Primary Steel. Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-131 (1990). 
23
-±Polsky, supra note 124, at 201 n.94 (emphasis in original) 
(citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 477, 482 (1999)). 
Although not a Chevron case, the Court in United States v. Craft, 
535 U.S. 274 (2002), upheld the IRS's view as to the reach of the 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Circuit courts disagreed whether their own precedents 
precluded contrary agency interpretations.235 
And as always, context matters. The "deference versus 
precedent" question could arise in any of three postures: 
"where a court interpreted a sta
1
tute before Chevron was 
decided; where a court interpreted a statute after Chevron 
and deferred to the agency; and where a court interpreted 
a statute after Chevron and, for one reason or another, 
refused to defer to the agency's interpretation."236 Pre-
Brand X commentators argued that precedent should 
control in the third situation237 but not in the first238 or 
second.239 
Brand X dramatically altered the landscape. The Com-
munications Act of 1934, as amended, subjects to man-
datory common-carrier regulation all those who provide 
"telecommunication services."2-t-0 In 2002 the FCC issued 
a ruling that cable companies selling broadband Internet 
service are not providing telecommunications services 
and so are exempt from that regulation. 
Numerous parties petitioned for judicial review of the 
ruling. By judicial lottery, the Ninth Circuit was selected 
as the venue for the challenge. In relevant part, the Ninth 
Orcuit vacated the FCC's ruling as an impermissible 
construction of the statute. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit 
chose not to apply Chevron but instead based its decision 
on stare decisis. 241 In the previous case, AT&T Corp. v. City 
of Portland"' - which had not involved the FCC as a 
party and had been decided several years before the FCC 
issued the challenged ruling - the Ninth Circuit reached 
a holding contrary to the conclusion in the ruling. In 
Brand X, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the Supreme 
Court's Neal decision,2-B AT&T overrode the FCC's con-
trary ruling. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that 
Chevron provided the appropriate standard of review. 
Congress made a delegation to the FCC similar to the 
delegation made to the Treasury under section 7805(a). 244 
That delegation gave the FCC "the authority to promul-
gate binding legal rules; the Commission issued the order 
federal tax lien under section 6321 despite the fact that genera-
tions of nearly unanimous 10V1'er court cases were to the 
contrary. 
235Co1npare EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 60 F.3d 
1225, 1229-1230 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 
202 (1997), with Satellite Broad. & Con1mun. Ass'n v. Oman, 17 F.3d 
344, 348 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 823 (1994). 
236Gossett, supra note 231, at 692 n.53. 
2371d. 
238Jahan Sharifi, "Precedents Construing Statutes Adminis-
tered by Federal Agencies After the Chevron Decision: What 
Gives?" 60 U. Chi. U.L. Re-o. 223, 229, 244-247 (1993). 
239Rebecca Hanner White, "The Stare Decisis 'Exception' to 
the Chevron Deference Rule," 44 Fla. L. Rev. 723, 726-728 (1992). 
2
'°47 U.S.C. section 153(44). 
°"345 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003), rev°d, 125 S. Ct. 2688 
(2005). 
°"2216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
2
-'
3Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). 
2
--J.--J.The FCC was given the power to "execute and enforce" 
the Communications Act and to "prescribe such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry 
out the provisions" of the act. 47 U.S.C. sections 151 and 201(b). 
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under revie"'A' in the exercise of that authority; and no one 
questions that the order is within the Commission's 
jurisdiction .... Hence, as we have in the past, we apply • 
the Chevron framework. "'.!--J.5 
Those challenging the FCC's ruling disputed the ap-
plicability of Chevron on the grounds that the ruling is 
inconsistent with the FCC' s past practice. The Court said; 
"We reject this argument. Agency inconsistency is not a 
basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation 
under the Chevron framework."246 
The Court then laid down the rule that matters for 
mutated Swallows, providing that prior judicial construc-
tion "trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled 
to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms 
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion."247 The Court distinguished Neal, 248 and it 
supported its new rule in three ways. First, the Court 
stated that "this principle follows from Chevron itself." 
Specifically, "allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an 
agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute ... would 
allow a court's interpretation to override an agency's. 
Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to 
fill statutory gaps."'49 
Second, the Court offered two policy arguments. One 
was that the Ninth Circuit's position "would 'lead to the 
ossification of large parts of our statutory law."'250 The 
other was the following anomaly. The Ninth Circuit's 
position: 
would mean that whether an agency's interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron • 
deference would turn on the order in which the 
interpretations issue: If the court's construction 
came first, its construction would prevail, whereas 
if the agency's came first, the agency's construction 
would command Chevron deference. Yet whether 
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority 
to interpret a statute does not depend on the order 
in which the judicial and administrative construc-
tions occur. 251 
Third, the Court responded to an objection raised by 
Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia accused the majority 
of "inventing yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial 
decisions subject to reversal by Executive officers."252 The 
Brand X majority disagreed. 
Since Chevron teaches that a court's opinion as to 
the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency 
is charged with administering is not authoritative, 
"
5125 S. Ct. at 2699. 
246Jd. 
2471d. at 2700. 
2
--J.
8Id. at 2701. The Court did acknowledge: "There is genuine 
confusion in the lower courts over the interaction betvveen the 
Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles." Id. at 2702. 
249Id. at 2700. 
dissenting)). - .· 
250Id. at 2700-2701 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, j ., • 
251125 S. Ct. at 2700. 
2521d. at 2719. 
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the agency's decision to construe that statute dif-
ferently from a court does not say that the court's 
holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency 
may ... choose a different construction, since the 
agency remains the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In all 
other respects, the court's prior ruling remains 
binding law (for example, as to agency interpreta-
tions to which Chevron is inapplicable).253 
Having established its rule, the Brand X Court applied 
it. The Court held that the AT&T case did not say its 
result was compelled by an unambiguous statute. That 
case "held only that [its construction was] the best 
reading ... not that it was the only permissible reading of 
the statute."254 That being so, and because the FCC's 
position survived scrutiny under both step one and step 
two of Chevron,255 the FCC's interpretation prevailed over 
the prior contrary Ninth Circuit decision. 
Major decisions often raise at least as many questions 
as they answer, and that surely is true of Brand X. The 
following are among the questions that may be ad-
dressed by future cases: 
• Does "unambiguous" mean the same thing for 
Brand X purposes as it does under Chevron step one? 
"If so, ... every case that reaches Step Two of Chev-
ron will be agency-reversible" under Brand X.256 
• Will the court's decision regarding ambiguity be 
conclusive? For example, can the agency, in the later 
case in which it is defending its interpretation, 
argue, "Yes, the earlier court said its ,interpretation 
was based on an unambiguous statute, but that 
conclusion is wrong"? 
• Will the later court have to decide whether the 
assertion of unambiguity was dictum or holding?2s7 
• "Does the 'unambiguous' dictum produce stare de-
cisis effect even when a court is affirming, rather than 
reversing, agency action - so that in the future the 
agency must adhere to that affirmed interpreta-
tion?"2ss 
• "If so, does the victorious agency have the right to 
appeal a Court of Appeals judgment in its favor, on 
the ground that the text in question is in fact not (as 
the Court of Appeals held) unambiguous, so the 
agency should be able to change its view in the 
future?"259 
253Jd. at 2701. The Court added: "The precedent has not been 
'reversed' by the agency, any more than a federal court's 
interpretation of a State's law can be said to have been 'reversed' 
by the state court that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative) 
interpretation of state law." Id. 
'"'Id. at 2701. 
255See id. at 2704-2710. 
256Jd. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting). . 257Note, supra note 228, at 1538. Justice Scalia said that such 
assertions would "presumably [beJ in dictum." 125 S. Ct. at 
2720. 258125 S. Ct. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
259Jd. 
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B. Brand X Applied to the Swallows Regulation 
Few of the implementation questions sketched above 
are present in mutated Swallows. There is a straight-
forward Brand X case for permitting the regulation at 
issue to trump the assumed time of SFR terminal date 
under the prior cases. As shown in Parts IV and V, the 
regulation is entitled to Chevron deference. And, as 
shown below, the prior cases did not hold that the time of 
SFR terminal date follows from the unambiguous terms 
of section 882(c)(2). 
One interesting question could arise were Chevron 
held inapplicable to the regulation at issue in Swallows. 
Could the government claim the benefit of Brand X 
anyway? The Tax Court said in both Swallows and 
elsewhere that Chevron merely restated National Muffler 
with a few "possibly subtle distinctions."260 If the two 
tests are essentially equivalent, and if, as I argue in the 
first report,261 the 1990 regulation would be entitled to 
deference under National Muffler, it could be argued that 
Brand X still should apply. Meeting Chevron in substance 
(via equivalency), even if not in name, should suffice to 
satisfy the precondition of the Brand X rule. Of course, we 
need not go down this road if, as I believe, the regulation 
is Chevron-entitled. 
The Swallows majority's responses to Brand X are 
unconvincing. The majority first offered: "Given that the 
Supreme Court has historically reviewed Federal tax 
regulations primarily under the reasonableness test of 
Natl. Muffler . .. , the question arises whether [Brand X], 
which neither cited Natl. Muffler nor involved a Federal 
tax regulation, applies to Federal tax regulations."262 That 
doesn't go very far. As described in Part IVA, the 
Supreme Court's application of Chevron in' tax cases has 
been unexplained and haphazard. However, if Chevron 
does apply, then Brand X would as well. Brand X is an 
elaboration of Chevron. To say that Chevron applies but 
Brand X does not would be to sunder the inseparable. 
The Swallows majority next advanced four grounds on 
which it thought Brand X to be distinguishable. First, the 
FCC had carefully considered the issue, but "here we find 
no corresponding record . . . the Secretary's rationale for 
adopting the disputed regulations is at best perfunc-
tory."263 Second, the FCC's ruling was consistent with 
prior FCC rulings, but the 1990 regulation "directly 
altered regulations adopted in (and unchanged since) 
1957."2°' Third, the FCC had not been a party to the 
AT&T case, but "here, the Commissioner was the unsuc-
cessful party in all the [prior] cases."265 Fourth, AT&T 
260126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995)). 261Johnson, supra note 6, Part VI. 
262126 T.C. at 143-144. 
263Id. at 144. 
264Id. 
265Id. The Swallozus majority persists in its curious habit of 
calling the IRS "the unsuccessful party" in the previous cases 
despite the fact that the IRS won most of them. 
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preceded Brand X by only about five years, while Anglo-
American preceded the 1990 regulation by about 50 
years.266 
judge Holmes said: "These distinctions should not 
make a difference - the Suprem~ Court did not balance 
carefulness of consideration, prior litigation history, or 
the amount of time that had passed between the case Jaw 
and the new regulation. It simply looked to see if the 
agency had been delegated broad regulatory authority 
and whether its construction of an ambiguous statutory 
phrase was reasonable."267 
judge Holmes's point is right, but it may not afford 
enough security. As shown in Part IV.A, Chevron was 
"refined" in sometimes surprising ways by subsequent 
cases. The same fate might befall Brand X. If the above-
described implementation questions prove difficult, or if 
some justices change their minds or are succeeded by 
differently minded jurists, Brand X could be subject to a 
process of common law revision. Thus, we should con-
sider not just whether the proffered distinctions appeared 
in Brand X but also whether they should. 
I think they should not. Most of the four grounds 
mentioned above are addressed to the wrong level. If 
they have any validity, they should be taken into account 
when deciding whether the agency's interpretation quali-
fies for Chevron deference in the first place. If that 
deference attaches, the grounds should play no further 
role. They do not provide reasons to sever Brand X 
preference lrom Chevron eligibility. Further, individually, 
each one of the four grounds offered by the majority lacks 
merit, as shown below. 
Care in consideration: The Swallows majority under-
stated the degree of consideration the IRS and Treasury 
gave to the terminal date. The Treasury decision accom-
panying the finalized regulation shows that Treasury 
made several changes to the proposed regulation based 
on consideration of comments received.268 It also makes 
clear that the IRS specifically considered objections to a 
terminal date but rejected them for both statutory and 
administrability reasons. 269 Moreover, the IRS' s position 
incubated during the decades of litigation of the issue, 
and the explanations the IRS gave should be read in 
conjunction with the explanations given by the prior 
cases as to the necessity of a terminal date in the statutory 
scheme.270 
Agency consistency: The 1957 regulation did not say 
that there is no terminal date; it simply was silent on the 
subject. Throughout the prior cases, the IRS argued for a 
terminal date (although not the 18-month date). The IRS 
litigated and won Espinosa and InverWorld after the 1957 
regulation was promulgated. Therefore, the suggestion of 
IRS inconsistency can be overplayed. 
There is also a more fundamental problem. In Brand X, 
the FCC's opponents accused the FCC of inconsistency. 
As quoted in Part VI.A, the principal reason the Court 
266Id. at 145. 
267/d. at 171-172 (Holmes,)., dissenting). 
268See T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172-173. 269Jd. at 172. 270See Part II.A supra. 
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rejected that argument was not that the FCC had been 
consistent but that agencies are permitted to change their 
mind. 271 That view should remain part of Brand X even if • 
reconstructed since that view is solidly rooted in Chevron 
itself.272 
IRS a party in prior cases: Reinterpreting Brand X in this 
way would seriously undermine the teaching of that, 
case. The Swallows situation (in which the agency was a 
party to the prior case or cases) is much more common 
than the AT&T situation (in which the agency was not a 
party). Confining Brand X to situations in which the 
agency had not been a party in the prior case would 
make Brand X an aspect of collateral estoppel-type rea-
soning273 rather than a concomitant of Chevron. That is 
not what Brand X contemplated. The Brand X majority 
noted that the FCC had not been a party in AT&T, but it 
gave no indication that its rule was confined to those 
situations. Justice Scalia said in dissent that he had made 
no "calculatio;,_ of how many hundreds of past statutory 
decisions" would be affected by Brand X, but that he 
suspected the number was very large.274 That prediction 
shows that, like the majority, the dissenters did not 
understand Brand X to apply only when the agency had 
been a party in the prior litigation. 
Tilne between prior cases and agency interpretation: Why 
would that matter? Conceivably, a Jong-settled rule could 
engender a reliance interest, but no reasonable reliance 
could exist in the Swallows situation. The .IRS continued 
to litigate - and win - the issue over the decades, and 
the 1990 regulation was proposed and finalized years 
before the tax years at issue in Swallows.275 The Swallows • 
majority linked the time gap to the legislative reenact-
ment doctrine.276 However, as shown in my first report, 
that doctrine is of dubious applicability to Swallows and, 
if it applies, supports rather than undercuts the validity 
of the 1990 regulation. 277 
There is another problem with the Swallows majority's 
argument. Were it accepted that too Jong a gap is 
problematic, the courts would be enmeshed in line-
drawing exercises. How long is too long? Courts prob-
ably would be reluctant to set a fixed time (as the prior 
cases were reluctant to settle on a fixed terminal date), 
and exploring the facts and circumstances of each case 
would waste judicial resources. Those exercises are best 
avoided by declining the invitation of the Swallows 
majority to amend Brand X to include a "time gap" factor. 
271 125 S. Ct. at 2699. 272
" An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in 
stone. On the contrary, the agency ... must consider varying 
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing 
basis." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864. Indeed, the EPA position 
that the Court upheld in Chevron was a change from the 
agency's previous position. 273See, e.g., Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273, 282~283 (1988) 
(discussing evolution of the doctrine of mutuality in collateral 
estoppel). 
2><125 S. Ct. at 2721. 275Johnson, supra note 6, Part \ 7.B.l. • 276126 T.C. at 145. 277Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.B.1. 
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In the du Pont case, the Third Circuit stated:" Although 
there may be situations in which substantial and preju-
dicial delay in exercising rule-making authority might 
alter the degree of deference accorded a regulation, we 
see no express prejudice here nor do we discern any other 
factors that would change the nature of our review."278 
The same situation exists in Swallows. 
In the event of failure of its distinctions, the Swallows 
majority had a last line of defense. Although it conceded 
that the prior cases "did not state explicitly that they 
were applying the unambiguous meaning of the word 
'manner' [in section 882(c)(2)]," the majority said that 
"we believe that they did so."279 
I believe that argument is indefensible. As shown in 
Part II, if the prior cases held anything unambiguously, it 
was that section 882(c)(2) contemplates some terminal 
date. Those cases hinted at many possible terminal dates 
or events but settled on none of them. We have assumed, 
for mutated Swallows purposes, that the prior cases stood 
for a time of SFR terminal date. However, neither collec-
tively nor individually did the prior cases hold that the 
time of SFR terminal date is unambiguously commanded 
by section 882(c)(2). Indeed, they couldn't. Nothing in the 
statutory language or purpose points to the date of SFR 
any more clearly than it points to 18 months. 
C. Summary 
Under Brand X, conflict between the regulation and 
the assumed case law rule should be resolved in favor of 
the regulation. The regulation is Chevron-entitled, and the 
prior cases did not declare - nor on section 882(c)(2) as 
it exists could they have declared - tl)at their rule 
followed unambiguously from the statute and so pre-
cluded administrative discretion. The arguments offered 
278£.I. du Pont de Ne1nours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 
135 (3d Cir. 1994). 
279126 T.C. at 145. 
TAX NOTES, August 28, 2006 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
by the Srvallorvs majority against Brand X are contrary to 
Brand X as it stands and should not be engrafted onto 
Brand X if the rule of that case is revised in the future. 
VII. Conclusion 
My previous report examined Swallozvs as it is. The 
prior cases taught that some timing limitation is implicit 
in section 882(c)(2), but neither the statute nor the cases 
defined that limitation. Filling statutory gaps is a role for 
Treasury and the IRS, and the 18-month rule in the 
regulation is reasonable. If National Muffler provides the 
appropriate standard, the regulation easily passes muster 
under it. 
This second report examined mutated Swallows, as-
suming that the prior cases established a date of SFR 
timing limitation inconsistent with the 18-month rule in 
the regulation. Even on that assumption, the regulation 
should be upheld. The regulation is Chevron-entitled at 
step zero, and it passes scrutiny at both step one and step 
two. Because the regulation qualifies for Chevron defer-
ence, the Brand X precondition is satisfied. Moreover, the 
prior cases neither said - nor, on section 8829(c)(2) as it 
exists, could they have said - that the date of SFR rule is 
unambiguously commanded by the statute, leaving Trea-
sury and the IRS no discretion to promulgate the 18-
month rule. Accordingly, under Brand X, any conflict 
between the regulation and the prior cases should be 
resolved in favor of the regulation. 
In short, the regulation should be upheld regardless of 
whether National Muffler or Chevron provides the govern-
ing standard. The Third Circuit should reverse Swallows. 
Whatever the outcome of Swallows, however, the issues 
discussed in this report will eventually be encountered in 
other tax cases. When regulations contravtfne prior case 
law, we will have to grapple with the significance of 
Brand X in tax. In turn, to the extent that Brand X depends 
on Chevron, that will compel us to rethink the roles of 
Chevron and the National Muffler line of cases . 
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